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INTRODUCTION 
As globalization has fostered increasing cross-border crime, so too has it 
triggered increasing international law enforcement cooperation. Government 
leaders like former FBI Director James Comey,1 former SEC Chair Mary Jo 
White,2 former Attorney General Loretta Lynch,3 and Republican Senator 
Orrin Hatch4 have all emphasized the urgency of such expansion in numerous 
 
1 See, e.g., James B. Comey, Director, FBI, Confronting the Cyber Threat (Nov. 18, 2015), 
https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/confronting-the-cyber-threat [http://perma.cc/X59Y-4UPU] (“[W]e’re 
going to deploy more of our people around the world. We’re going to push our analysts, and our cyber agents, 
our experts, to more and more places around the world—because even though this is an infrastructure-, a 
fiber-optic-based threat, those physical relationships, especially with our foreign partners where the keyboards 
may sit in their jurisdictions, matter tremendously.”); James B. Comey, Director, FBI, The FBI’s Approach to 
the Cyber Threat (Aug. 30, 2016), https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/the-fbis-approach-to-the-cyber-threat 
[https://perma.cc/294C-NQK2] (“[W]e’re trying to forward deploy far more cyber agents and cyber analysts 
and have them sit with our foreign partners.”); James B. Comey, Director, FBI, Fighting Terrorism in the 
Digital Age (Nov. 3, 2014), https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/fighting-terrorism-in-the-digital-age 
[http://perma.cc/U9B4-6FPU] (“[W]e have to work together with our federal, state, local, and international 
partners to identify and stop those who are coming after us.”). 
2 See, e.g., Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, Securities Regulation in the Interconnected, Global 
Marketplace (Sept. 21, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/securities-regulation-in-the-
interconnected-global-marketplace.html [http://perma.cc/G6JZ-RD2F] (“While international 
cooperation and coordination have increased significantly in recent years, we still face significant 
challenges from laws and practices that can impede strong regulation, supervision, and enforcement. 
And it is incumbent upon the SEC and our international counterparts to work through these issues 
in a way that provides maximum cooperation and coordination and avoids regulatory arbitrage.”). 
3 See, e.g., Loretta Lynch, U.S. Att’y Gen., Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch Addresses the 
20th Annual International Association of Prosecutors Conference (Sept. 14, 2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-loretta-e-lynch-addresses-20th-annual-
international-association [http://perma.cc/K6GW-LFHS] (“As we have seen time and again that 
collaboration is crucial, and it’s why we have worked hard to strengthen the bonds we share with our 
partners, and to enhance cooperation in all law enforcement matters—from corruption to white 
collar crime and money laundering; from terrorism to cyberattacks. To achieve this end, it is essential 
that we have strong mechanisms for providing mutual legal assistance to each other . . . .”). 
4 Press Release, Senator Orrin Hatch, Release: Lynch Agrees to Work with Hatch on 
Republican High-Tech Task Force Priorities (Jan. 28, 2015), https://www.hatch.senate.gov/
public/index.cfm/releases?ID=71B6D550-494A-4127-84E4-BB251339FB04 [http://perma.cc/4FKN-
HZ5M] (highlighting the importance of the LEADS Act, sponsored by the Senator, which seeks to 
“promote international comity and law enforcement cooperation”). 
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speeches and in their allocation of resources. Cases of terrorism, cybercrime, 
financial fraud, and corruption are forcing the U.S. government to rely 
increasingly on foreign partners for extraditions, evidence gathering for use 
at U.S. trials, parallel investigations, and informal investigative support. 
However, U.S. jurisprudence has not kept pace with these developments. An 
emerging struggle for U.S. prosecutors comes when our laws, and in 
particular our Constitution, clash with those of a partner country. This 
Comment will outline one such predicament found in United States v. Allen: 
whether the Fifth Amendment bars the admission of testimony compelled by 
a foreign sovereign.5 Because there are no other cases that have addressed this 
specific issue,6 this Comment will analogize to related Supreme Court 
precedent and other situations to theorize how other courts will and should 
treat foreign government–compelled testimony. Part I of this Comment will 
first analyze the full Allen hypothetical and the Second Circuit’s ruling. Part 
II of the Comment will consider the Department of Justice’s analogizing of 
the Allen situation to the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Balsys7 
regarding the applicability of the Fifth Amendment in a U.S. deposition 
where the defendant fears criminal prosecution by a foreign government. It 
will address three arguments raised by the Balsys Court in arriving at its 
decision, namely 1) the textual context of the Self-Incrimination Clause, 2) the 
Same-Sovereign Rule, and 3) relevant policy considerations, and apply them 
to the Allen situation. Part II will then apply the Balsys Court’s suggestion of 
a standard based on “cooperative internationalism,” or closeness of law 
 
5 Note that Judge Jed Rakoff of the District Court intentionally sidestepped the self-incrimination 
issue in the initial opinion on this case, though the Second Circuit overturned him on that basis and 
denied the government’s request for a rehearing en banc. 160 F. Supp. 3d 684, 690 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), 
rev’d, 864 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2017) (acknowledging and then declining to address the issue, deciding the 
case on alternate grounds); reh’g en banc denied No. 16-898 (2d Cir. Nov. 9, 2017).  
6 The Second Circuit cited to numerous ostensibly parallel cases in footnotes 67 and 68 of its 
decision as “sufficient to resolve the present dispute regarding whether compulsion by a foreign 
power implicates the Fifth Amendment” in favor of full Fifth Amendment protections. United 
States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63, 80 nn.67–68 (2d Cir. 2017). However, those cases are all quite factually 
distinct from the Allen situation, as they focus on coercive acts by foreign governments, rather than 
those that might simply be considered compelled. For a full discussion on this distinction see infra 
subsection III.B.2. 
Ironically, some of the same cases cited by the Second Circuit are also cited in a 2016 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) report as evidence of the opposite proposition that “the 
Fifth Amendment self-incrimination clause and its attendant Miranda warning requirements do not 
apply to statements made abroad to foreign officials.” CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL94-166, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW 28 (2016). The 
CRS report goes on to discuss voluntariness as a general prerequisite for admissibility, but cites to 
only domestic cases and those where voluntariness is in question due to torture or other acts that 
“shock the conscience,” a materially different issue and one that does not address the 
involuntariness/compulsion distinction previously mentioned. Id. at 28-29. 
7 524 U.S. 666 (1998). 
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enforcement cooperation, to trigger Fifth Amendment applicability. Part III of 
the Comment will assess 1) courts’ occasional practice of assuming applicability 
without any discussion, 2) parallels to the case law on Miranda warnings and 
broader due process arguments, and 3) testimony compelled by Congress. Part 
IV will analyze the spectrum of potential standards courts could apply to the 
admissibility of foreign government–compelled testimony. In addition to 
considering six different options, from barring any self-incriminatory 
compelled testimony to allowing all of it, the Comment will recommend a 
middle path forward based on differing levels of cooperation and good faith 
efforts by prosecutors. Although foreign-compelled testimony enters complex 
legal territory, it should be allowed into evidence where the U.S. government 
is not acting entirely in concert with foreign officials and where U.S. officials 
have taken reasonable steps to avoid Fifth Amendment concerns. 
I. THE PROBLEM POSED BY UNITED STATES V. ALLEN 
In United States v. Allen, the Southern District of New York and the 
Second Circuit diverged on a highly salient issue of first impression. Anthony 
Allen and Anthony Conti, among others, were charged in federal court with 
wire fraud after they were suspected of manipulating U.S. dollar and Japanese 
Yen London Interbank Offered Rates8 (LIBOR).9 As part of an independent 
United Kingdom investigation into the same conduct, Allen and Conti were 
compelled to testify by the U.K.’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA),10 
potentially under penalty of imprisonment.11 U.K. regulators granted the 
men direct use immunity, but not derivative use immunity, a distinction 
disallowed under U.S. law.12 Paul Robson, who ultimately became an 
 
8 LIBOR is a metric to gauge interest rates for bank borrowing across different currencies and 
can be described as “one of the best known and most important interest rates in the world . . . . [due 
to] its widespread use as a benchmark for many other interest rates at which business is actually carried 
out.” John Kiff, What is LIBOR?, INT’L MONETARY FUND: FIN. & DEV., Dec. 2012, at 32, 32, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2012/12/pdf/basics.pdf [https://perma.cc/BSG5-3NY8]. 
9 Superseding Indictment at 33-34, Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d 684 (No. 1:14-cr-00272-JSR). 
10 The U.K. Financial Conduct Authority has criminal, civil, and regulatory enforcement 
powers. See Enforcement, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., https://www.fca.org.uk/about/enforcement 
[http://perma.cc/H87V-HF8V]. The entity is essentially a counterpart to the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission, but with enforcement powers that include imprisonment. See, e.g., Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000, ch. 8, §§ 397(1), (8)(b), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/
2000/8/pdfs/ukpga_20000008_en.pdf [http://perma.cc/GPA8-EX57] (ascribing a sentence of up to 
seven years imprisonment for the provision of a false or misleading statement on investments under 
certain circumstances, enforced by the Financial Conduct Authority). 
11 Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d at 688. 
12 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL: CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL 
§ 718 (1997), https://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-718-derivative-use-immunity 
[https://perma.cc/L58P-EV22] (discussing the Supreme Court’s upholding of the federal immunity 
statute mandating both direct and derivative use immunity). For the purposes of this Comment, the 
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immunized witness in the United States, was interviewed by the FCA and, 
pursuant to U.K. law, provided with transcripts from Allen’s and Conti’s 
compelled interviews.13 In response, attorneys for Allen and Conti both 
submitted motions asking the U.S. court to compel immunity for their 
clients, but they were rejected.14 After Robson’s testimony in the U.S. 
contributed to a successful conviction of Allen and Conti, their lawyers 
submitted a motion for a post-trial Kastigar hearing.15 They argued that, 
because Robson’s review of their FCA transcripts violated their Fifth 
Amendment rights and therefore tainted Robson’s testimony in the U.S. 
proceedings, the charges against Allen and Conti should be dismissed.16  
Cognizant of the potential problem, the U.S. Department of Justice 
(DOJ) had made clear to Robson before he testified in U.S. court that he was 
not to share any of the information he gleaned from Allen’s and Conti’s 
transcripts with U.S. prosecutors, and the DOJ held extensive meetings with 
the FCA about the need to establish a wall between the two agencies to 
prevent any taint of the DOJ’s case.17 In fact, the DOJ went as far as to use a 
separate filter team of attorneys from a different section of the Department 
to address issues related to the FCA depositions.18 Of note, the potential U.S. 
constitutional concerns of compelled testimony had apparently been raised 
by defense counsel to U.K. authorities during a U.K. hearing.19 
 
distinction between direct use and derivative use immunity presents a wrinkle in analyzing the 
appropriateness of using compelled testimony in U.S. courts, and highlights the reality that U.S. and 
foreign protections against self-incrimination do not perfectly overlap. But, this is not a primary 
concern of this Comment. For a fuller treatment of this issue, see generally Neal Modi, Note, Toward 
an International Right Against Self-Incrimination: Expanding the Fifth Amendment’s “Compelled” to Foreign 
Compulsion, 103 VA. L. REV. 961 (2017). 
13 Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d at 689. 
14 See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Compel the Government to 
Immunize Submitter-R1 and for a Rule 15 Deposition of Submitter-R1, or, in the Alternative, to Exclude 
Testimony from Government Witnesses at 18-19, Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d 684 (No. 1:14-cr-00272-JSR); see 
also Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Compel the Government to Immunize 
Submitter-R3, or, in the Alternative, for a Jury Instruction Regarding Submitter-R3’s Testimony at 1, 13, 
Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d 684  (No. 1:14-cr-00272-JSR). 
15 “When a witness/defendant establishes [that the government used or intends to use 
immunized testimony to indict him or prove his guilt], a proceeding known as a Kastigar hearing 
is used to determine if the government improperly used his immunized testimony . . . . The timing 
of the hearing varies; many courts hold it before trial, but others defer it until during or after trial.” 
1 SUSAN W. BRENNER & LORI E. SHAW, FEDERAL GRAND JURY: A GUIDE TO LAW AND 
PRACTICE § 12.15 (2d ed. 2006). 
16 Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d at 690. 
17 Id. at 694-95. 
18 Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Based on Kastigar at 2 n.1, 
Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d 684 (No. 1:14-cr-00272-JSR). 
19 Oral Argument at 31:20-32:30, United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2017) (No. 16-898-cr), 
http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/oral_arguments.html (click on “2017” and scroll to Jan. 26, 2017 arguments) 
[https://perma.cc/QQ6A-KQYH]. 
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Intentionally avoiding the question of the Fifth Amendment’s applicability,20 
Judge Rakoff of the Southern District of New York settled the hearing on a 
separate issue. Judge Rakoff held that the DOJ established a “strict and effective 
wall of separation”21 that insulated the government’s case from any potentially 
tainted evidence and met whatever Kastigar burden might exist on the facts 
presented. But on appeal, the Second Circuit disagreed, finding a blanket ban 
“on the use of compelled testimony in American criminal proceedings . . . even 
when a foreign sovereign has compelled the testimony.”22 Moreover, the Second 
Circuit found that the witnesses were substantially exposed to compelled 
testimony, reversing the convictions and dismissing the indictment.23 
The Second Circuit’s ruling raises two issues: 1) whether resource-intensive, 
complex, and potentially risky machinations by the DOJ should be necessary, 
and 2) in the face of such strict judicial scrutiny, whether close international law 
enforcement cooperation is advisable under the Second Circuit’s new 
precedent. Fundamentally, the question that needs to be answered is this: In a 
case where otherwise inadmissible evidence from a foreign government’s legal 
proceedings leaks into a U.S. prosecution through no direct action by U.S. 
authorities, can that evidence taint the entire case, requiring dismissal? As Allen 
demonstrates, this question is no longer a mere hypothetical.24 
II. ANALYZING THE BALSYS SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT 
The closest analogous Supreme Court precedent to the Allen situation, 
and the primary precedent cited in the Government’s brief opposing the 
 
20 See Allen, 160 F. Supp 3d at 690 n.8 (ruling that there was no need to determine if Kastigar 
applied, because even if it did apply to foreign government–compelled testimony, the government 
had already met its Kastigar burden). 
21 Id. at 695. 
22 Allen, 864 F.3d at 68. 
23 Id. at 69. 
24 Indeed, at a 2016 conference sponsored by the American Society of International Law and attended 
by the author, a panel discussion between Judge Jed Rakoff and Carol Sipperly (an Allen prosecuting 
attorney) highlighted the issue of foreign-compelled testimony as one likely to arise with increasing 
frequency in federal court. In a recent article for Law360, David Rundle of the law firm 
WilmerHale raised a similar sentiment. See David Rundle, Testing the 5th: Compelled Testimony From 
Foreign Gov’ts, LAW360 (Apr. 11, 2016, 10:36 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/782250/testing-the-
5th-compelled-testimony-from-foreign-gov-ts [https://perma.cc/4NKC-5XJN] (noting the combination of 
international investigations into financial institutions and the wide jurisdictional reach of federal courts is 
likely to lead to further cases like Allen). The issue has been raised hypothetically at least as far back as 2014. 
See John Vukelj & Megan K. Vesely, How the SEC May Receive Testimony Compelled in U.K., Canada, 
N.Y. L.J. (Apr. 7, 2014), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202649563089/How-the-SEC-May-
Receive-Testimony-Compelled-in-UK-Canada?slreturn=20170817223350 [http://perma.cc/44ER-3NNF] 
(“[T]he exchange of [foreign government–compelled] testimony raises concerns about how the 
privilege against self-incrimination operates in cross-border investigations.”). 
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Kastigar motion to dismiss in Allen, is United States v. Balsys.25 There, Justice 
Souter’s 7–2 majority opinion limited Fifth Amendment protections for 
individuals facing foreign prosecution.26 The Balsys plaintiff was a suspected 
Nazi war criminal subpoenaed by the Department of Justice’s Office of 
Special Investigations (OSI), an office formed specifically to denaturalize and 
deport Nazis.27 He invoked the Fifth Amendment at a DOJ deposition, 
claiming that his responses to OSI’s questions “could subject him to criminal 
prosecution by Lithuania, Israel, and Germany.”28 The Supreme Court 
rejected the plaintiff ’s refusal to testify, basing its opinion on the textual 
context of the Fifth Amendment in the Constitution, the same-sovereign rule 
originally gleaned from United States v. Murdock,29 and policy considerations 
that weighed heavily towards executive branch deference.30 Ultimately, the 
Balsys Court found that sufficiently close cooperation between U.S. 
prosecutors and their foreign counterparts could be grounds for exclusion, 
but that the facts at issue in Balsys did not merit such a finding.31 
These elements offer unique insight into the problem of foreign-compelled 
testimony, because Balsys is Allen’s mirror image. In Balsys, U.S. prosecutors 
compelled statements that could be used in possible overseas prosecutions, while in 
Allen overseas prosecutors compelled statements that were used in a U.S. 
prosecution. Balsys also introduces the salient concept of a threshold point for 
“cooperative internationalism,” or a point at which U.S. and foreign prosecutors 
collaborate so closely that they should be considered the same for Fifth Amendment 
purposes.32 As such, although key distinctions exist between the two cases, the Balsys 
decision provides a foundation for analyzing an Allen-type situation. 
A. Applying Three Core Balsys Arguments 
Though Balsys is not binding precedent, three of the core arguments made 
by the Supreme Court in that case are instructive here: the linguistic context 
of the Self-Incrimination Clause, the same-sovereign rule, and the several 
policy considerations raised. Interestingly, however, the Second Circuit panel 
in Allen, both in the opinion and during oral arguments, refrained from serious 
analysis of Balsys outside of rejecting the relevancy of the same-sovereign 
 
25 524 U.S. 666 (1998). 
26 Id. at 698. 
27 Id. at 670. 
28 Id. 
29 290 U.S. 389, 396 (1933) (“[O]ne under examination in a federal tribunal could not refuse 
to answer on account of probable incrimination under state law.”). 
30 Balsys, 524 U.S. at 691-698. 
31 Id. at 693-96 (identifying the concept of cooperative internationalism and rejecting it as a 
sufficient issue in the case). 
32 Id. at 698-699. 
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rule.33 The Department of Justice devoted some analysis to Balsys in its original 
district court brief,34 but the Government’s arguments on appeal focused on a 
wider interpretation of the Fifth Amendment that drew parallels between the 
positioning of a private enterprise and foreign government.35 This strategy 
was handily rejected by the Second Circuit.36 Ultimately, then, the three core 
Balsys arguments are most instructive as an analytical framework largely 
neglected at the Second Circuit. 
1. Linguistic Context of the Self-Incrimination Clause37 
The Fifth Amendment’s meaning is comparatively less clear in the Allen 
context than the Court purports it to be in Balsys. The Balsys Court applies the 
noscitur a sociis38 canon of interpretation to assert that the Self-Incrimination 
Clause should be read in the context of the other clauses of the Fifth 
Amendment, rather than as drawing a contrast to the further-removed Sixth 
Amendment, which clearly only applies in a domestic context.39 Specifically, 
the Court asserts that the Self-Incrimination Clause’s reference to “any 
criminal case” was meant to distinguish the Clause from an earlier portion of 
the Amendment referencing “capital, or otherwise infamous crime[s]” rather 
than to broaden the Clause to cover international jurisdictions.40 No historical 
records or legislative history from the enactment of the Constitution speak to 
 
33 See Oral Argument at 1:18:30-1:25:15, United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2017) (No. 
16-898-cr), http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/oral_arguments.html (click on “2017” and scroll to Jan. 26, 
2017 arguments) [https://perma.cc/QQ6A-KQYH] (discussing the compelled testimony issue with 
no references to the “same-sovereign” issue or to Balsys); see also Allen, 864 F.3d at 85-86 (refuting 
the Government’s “same-sovereign” argument by distinguishing the Fifth Amendment as a personal 
trial right without engaging any of the substantive arguments in Balsys). 
34 Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Based on Kastigar at 7-11, 
United States v. Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d 684 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (No. 1:14-cr-00272-JSR) (arguing that 
following Balsys, the Self-Incrimination Clause is not implicated when a foreign sovereign compels 
testimony under the same-sovereign rule). 
35 Allen, 864 F.3d at 84. 
36 See id. at 84-85 (rejecting the Government’s private employer argument). 
37 The full text of the Fifth Amendment is as follows: “No person shall be held to answer for 
a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, 
except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of 
War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy 
of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public 
use, without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added). 
38 “It is known from its associates.” 
39 United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 672-73 (1998). 
40 Id. 
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the linguistic issue.41 Such a finding raises the question as to which aspects of 
“any criminal case” are limited to domestic applicability. 
In an Allen-type situation, the issue is whether a “criminal case” as defined 
under the Fifth Amendment includes an intentional investigative portion by 
another foreign body. As highlighted by the Second Circuit, the prosecution 
is undoubtedly domestic,42 but the gathering of evidence in preparation for 
that prosecution occurs internationally, informed at least somewhat by 
independent foreign government actors who are not obligated to comply with 
the Fifth Amendment. The Court held in Kastigar v. United States that the 
Fifth Amendment privilege “can be asserted in any proceeding, civil or 
criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory; and it 
protects against any disclosures which the witness reasonably believes could be 
used in a criminal prosecution . . . .”43 As with the Fifth Amendment text, the 
Kastigar Court did not distinguish whether “any disclosures” referred only to 
disclosures to domestic authorities and in domestic proceedings or to 
international ones as well, but the Balsys Court’s domestic-only interpretation 
could arguably suggest the former.44 Where foreign governments do the 
compelling, it is unclear whether that foreign government investigation is 
intended to be treated as part of “any criminal case” under the Fifth 
Amendment when the resulting evidence enters a U.S. trial. 
Per Supreme Court precedent in Chavez v. Martinez, a violation of the 
Self-Incrimination Clause occurs when such evidence is used at trial, not 
during the act of coercive questioning.45 In Chavez, the Court distinguished 
between claims under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, stating, 
 
41 Id. at 673 n.5 (citing to sources asserting the Self-Incrimination Clause has almost no 
legislative grounding and that the “any criminal case” language was added for purposes irrelevant 
here). The dissent concedes the lack of history undergirding the Self-Incrimination Clause and its 
extraterritorial applicability. Id. at 711-12 (citing the analysis of United States v. Gecas, 120 F.3d 1419, 
1435 (11th Cir. 1997) among other sources, to establish an absence of legislative history on Fifth 
Amendment privilege). 
42 See United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63, 81 (2d Cir. 2017) (“Whatever may occur prior to 
trial, the right not to testify against oneself at trial is ‘absolute.’” (emphasis in original) (quoting 
Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2179 (2013))). 
43 406 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1972) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
44 Supra note 41. However, note that the Second Circuit in Allen interpreted this same issue 
differently. See Allen, 864 F.3d at 86 n.99 (citing to Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Murphy v. 
Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor that the use of compelled testimony at trial is part of the courts’ 
“‘supervisory power’ over the administration of justice in federal courts,” and characterizing it as 
consistent with Balsys (quoting 378 U.S. 52, 81 (1964)) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
45 538 U.S. 760, 767 (2003) (“[I]t is not until [an unconstitutionally compelled statement’s] use 
in a criminal case that a violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause occurs.”). Note that this precedent 
is relied on by the Allen defendant. See Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of 
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Superseding Indictment on Kastigar Grounds at 3, United States 
v. Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d 684 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (No. 1:14-cr-00272-JSR) (citing to Chavez in its 
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Our views on the proper scope of the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination 
Clause do not mean that police torture or other abuse that results in a confession 
is constitutionally permissible so long as the statements are not used at trial; it 
simply means that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, rather 
than the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause, would govern the 
inquiry in those cases and provide relief in appropriate circumstances.46 
Coercive questions then can violate different rights at different 
times—Fourteenth Amendment due process rights at the time of 
questioning and the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination upon 
their admission at trial.47 Still, although self-incrimination may occur when the 
evidence is used at trial, it must be unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment 
in the first place to constitute a violation.48 At issue, then, is whether foreign 
government–compelled testimony should be carved out as “extra-Constitutional” 
testimony in a U.S. trial, which Chavez does not address. 
2. Limitations Imposed by the Same-Sovereign Rule 
As argued by the Department of Justice, the same-sovereign rule originally 
espoused in United States v. Murdock49 points in the direction of limiting the 
applicability of the Self-Incrimination Clause in such cases.50 The Balsys Court 
explains the same-sovereign rule as “limiting [the Self-Incrimination Clause’s] 
principle to concern with prosecution by a sovereign that is itself bound by the 
 
argument that “a violation of the Fifth Amendment occurs not when the involuntary statements are 
elicited, but when they are used in a U.S. prosecution” (emphasis in original)). 
46 Chavez, 538 U.S. at 773. 
47 Note that this issue was raised at oral arguments, in briefs, and in the final opinion. See, e.g., 
Oral Argument at 1:18:30-1:25:15, Allen, 864 F.3d 63 (No. 16-898-cr), http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/
oral_arguments.html (click on “2017” and scroll to Jan. 26, 2017 arguments) 
[https://perma.cc/QQ6A-KQYH]. (raising the idea that constitutional concerns outside of the Fifth 
Amendment could arise from foreign government–compelled testimony); see also Allen, 864 F.3d at 
83 (rejecting the Government’s citation to Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986), on the basis that 
it was a Fourteenth Amendment case). This question raises two subsidiary issues: 1) whether 
testimony collected abroad, that would arguably violate a defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment due 
process rights if collected in the United States, is in fact a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
and if so 2) whether a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment related to self-incrimination 
necessarily implicates the Fifth Amendment and would lead to tainted evidence at trial. Perhaps a 
defense attorney could argue to exclude evidence at trial on Fourteenth Amendment grounds, or on 
Fifth Amendment grounds based on the Fourteenth Amendment due process violation, but such 
arguments are beyond the scope of this Comment. 
48 See, e.g., Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 276 (1968) (asserting that individuals can waive 
constitutional concerns about privilege in appropriate circumstances). 
49 290 U.S. 389, 391 (1933), overruled in part by Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 
378 U.S. 52 (1964). 
50 See Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Based on Kastigar at 7-11, 
Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d 684 (No. 1:14-cr-00272-JSR) (explaining that the Self-Incrimination Clause 
should not apply to all cases of this type). 
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Clause.”51 Parallel to Balsys, Murdock involved a federal defendant hesitant to 
testify for fear of self-incrimination in state court, a concern about which the 
Court was unmoved.52 Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor 
overturned Murdock,53 a move the Balsys majority explained was necessary after 
Malloy v. Hogan54 “applied the doctrine of Fourteenth Amendment due process 
incorporation to the Self-Incrimination Clause, so as to bind the States as well 
as the National Government to recognize the privilege.”55 Interestingly, 
Murphy dealt with a situation parallel to Allen rather than Murdock or Balsys, 
as the concern in Murphy was that compelled state testimony might be 
admitted into evidence at a federal trial.56 The Murphy Court resolved this 
incongruence by saying that since the privilege was fully applicable to both 
sovereigns, the question was the same.57 This meant that post-Malloy, the 
federal and state governments were seen as the same-sovereign, maintaining 
Murdock’s logic but undercutting its presumption that state and federal 
governments represented fundamentally different sovereigns.58 
If read broadly, Balsys suggests that the primary concern of the case law is 
matching the source of compulsion and the source of prosecution, rather than 
simply determining whether there was unconstitutional compulsion to elicit 
evidence which was then used in a U.S. trial. In reconciling Murdock with 
Murphy, the Court emphasized that “the courts of a government from which 
a witness may reasonably fear prosecution may not in fairness compel the 
witness to furnish testimonial evidence that may be used to prove his guilt.”59 
Where foreign governments are concerned, U.S. prosecutors generally have 
no hand in compelling testimony. Justice Breyer’s dissent decried the 
underlying proposition here that “prosecution by a different sovereign seems 
not quite as unfair as prosecution by the same-sovereign,”60 but the Court’s 
majority accepted this reasoning because of the marked differences between 
 
51 United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 689 (1998). 
52 Murdock, 290 U.S. at 391, 397 (affirming the lower court’s conviction of the defendant for 
refusing to give testimony). 
53 378 U.S. 52, 73 (1964), abrogated by Balsys, 524 U.S. 666. 
54 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964) (holding that “the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed the petitioner 
the protection of the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination”). 
55 Balsys, 524 U.S. at 680-81. 
56 Murphy, 378 U.S. at 53-54. 
57 Id. at 53 n.1. 
58 Using this logic, the Balsys Court rejected the Murphy Court’s claim to overturn Murdock. 
See Balsys, 524 U.S. at 689. The Balsys majority explicitly rejected the Murphy majority’s policy 
arguments as well as its historical arguments unrelated to Malloy and the Fourteenth Amendment 
for overturning Murdock. Id. at 686-91. 
59 Id. at 683. Note that, in Allen, the government advanced the same argument using this quote. 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Based on Kastigar at 9, United 
States v. Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d 684 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (No. 1:14-cr-00272-JSR). 
60 Balsys, 524 U.S. at 717-18. 
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the federal–state and U.S.–foreign power relationships.61 The majority saw 
the fairness issue as helping a defendant avoid being “‘whipsawed’ into 
incriminating himself under both state and federal law, even though the 
privilege [against self-incrimination] was applicable to each,”62 and avoiding 
historical practices of an overreaching government coercing confessions.63 
But, these are not of grave concern where the compelling and prosecuting 
authorities diverge in their legal obligations.64 In the Balsys and Allen 
contexts, deterrence only extends so far as U.S. authorities can persuade their 
foreign counterparts to follow U.S. law to which they are not subject, unlike 
the States which are directly subject to the Fifth Amendment under 
Fourteenth Amendment incorporation.65 Without such a connection, the 
rationale of the Self-Incrimination Clause is not met and the Murphy 
arguments for applicability are undermined. 
Herein potentially lies a divergence between an Allen analysis and a Balsys 
analysis. Allen presents a scenario where U.S. authorities have significantly 
more control over the resulting prosecution than in Balsys, where foreign 
governments can use the defendant’s American-compelled testimony as they 
wish. U.S. prosecutors could share evidence with foreign counterparts only 
when they are convinced it will not be used in contravention of the Eighth 
Amendment or move for judges to seal proceedings where evidence exposing 
defendants to self-incrimination in a foreign jurisdiction could come into 
play, but such actions are within the discretion of prosecutors and are not 
required,66 and judges are particularly hesitant to infringe on the executive 
branch’s authority to conduct foreign affairs.67 
In line with the Second Circuit’s general reasoning, the increased 
American control over fairness of prosecution in Allen-type scenarios places 
a heavier burden on U.S. prosecutors to ensure that fairness is achieved 
because courts would be addressing the conduct of U.S. prosecutors without 
the Balsys-type direct implications for American foreign policy. Prosecutor 
 
61 In fact, the Balsys majority acknowledged that “[p]rior to Murphy, such ‘whipsawing’ efforts 
had been permissible, but arguably less outrageous since, as the opinion notes, ‘either the 
“compelling” government or the “using” government [was] a State, and, until today, the States were 
not deemed fully bound by the privilege against self-incrimination.’” Id. at 681-82 n.7 (quoting 
Murphy, 378 U.S. at 57 n.6). 
62 Id. at 667. 
63 Id. at 693 (noting that preventing government overreach “lies at the core of the [Self-Incrimination] 
Clause’s purposes”). 
64 See supra notes 52, 57–58. 
65 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964). 
66 Note that judges could take similar actions unilaterally as well. 
67 Deborah N. Pearlstein, After Deference: Formalizing the Judicial Power for Foreign Relations Law, 
159 U. PA. L. REV. 783, 785 (2011) (“Historically, most scholars have accepted with little question the 
notion that the Court will defer to executive views in core matters of foreign relations.”). 
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misconduct with regard to compelled testimony can be deterred in Allen in a 
way not possible in foreign prosecutions, strengthening the Court’s overall 
Fifth Amendment goal to deter the abuse of compelled testimony.68 However, 
prosecutors still lack significant control in cases where U.S. authorities are 
not gathering the evidence for U.S. prosecutions. As will be discussed in the 
next subsection, there are also policy reasons why the receptivity of other 
governments to U.S. standards should not dictate the ability of U.S. law 
enforcement to prosecute a domestic case. 
3. Balancing Policy Considerations 
The balance of policy considerations espoused by the Balsys secondary 
majority69 similarly weighs in favor of curtailing the applicability of the Fifth 
Amendment in the Allen context. The Court criticizes Murphy as offering a 
Panglossian declaration of the policies underpinning the privilege against 
self-incrimination, rather than any sort of serious analysis. To the Murphy 
Court, the Self-Incrimination Clause 
reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations: our 
unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of 
self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather 
than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating 
statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of 
fair play which dictates “a fair state-individual balance by requiring the 
government to leave the individual alone until good cause is shown for 
disturbing him and by requiring the government in its contest with the 
individual to shoulder the entire load,”; our respect for the inviolability of the 
human personality and of the right of each individual “to a private enclave 
where he may lead a private life,”; our distrust of self-deprecatory statements; 
and our realization that the privilege, while sometimes “a shelter to the 
guilty,” is often “a protection to the innocent.”70 
For its part, the Balsys Court argues that in this statement the Murphy Court 
“does not even purport to weigh the host of competing policy concerns that would 
be raised in a legitimate reconsideration of the Clause’s scope.”71 The same passage 
 
68 See Fifth Amendment: Michigan v. Tucker, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 466, 472-73 
(1974) (discussing the deterrence of law enforcement misconduct as part of the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning on Fifth Amendment protections). 
69 Note that Justices Thomas and Scalia declined to join Parts IV and V of the opinion, leaving 
those parts at 5–4 decisions rather than 7–2. United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 668 (1998). 
70 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (citations omitted). 
71 Balsys, 524 U.S. at 691. 
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dismisses many of the aforementioned policies as either domestically focused or 
historically unsupported, more rhetorical flourish than serious policy.72 
One policy argument taken up by the Balsys Court’s critique and relevant 
to the Allen context is its framing of testimonial privilege more as an immunity 
transaction than as an inviolable right.73 Because courts do not have the 
authority to enforce immunity abroad, and given that the Kastigar decision 
requires that immunity be coextensive with Fifth Amendment protections,74 it 
follows that if immunity were to apply to foreign prosecutions, the government 
could never offer immunity deals to defendants implicated in international 
crimes.75 In the Allen context, the implications of this conception deviate 
slightly based on the timeline, but the crux of the argument is the same—U.S. 
authorities do not have the authority to offer immunity in a deal made by 
investigators outside of U.S. control. In fact, foreign authorities can act outside 
Fifth Amendment privileges during the investigative phase without any 
intervention by U.S. prosecutors, and if they choose to publicize their findings 
in a way that taints a U.S. investigation with compelled testimony (say, by 
publishing or sending tainted information to U.S. prosecutors or key witnesses 
without identifying it as such), either the entire U.S. investigation must end or 
the defendant’s immunity privilege must be withdrawn. These concerns were 
raised in the Department of Justice’s district court brief, which called attention 
to the specter of “a hostile government bent on frustrating prosecution of a 
defendant in the United States . . . compel[ling] the witness to testify and 
publiciz[ing] the substance of his testimony . . . . unilaterally put[ting] the 
United States to the heavy Kastigar burden.”76 The Second Circuit responded 
that because the Allen case did not itself raise such concerns, the issue need 
not be decided.77 However, the Second Circuit’s dismissal of this issue belies 
the urgency of this flaw in its reasoning—the concerns of a hostile foreign 
power manipulating our justice system are not idle. Former Vice President 
Joseph Biden and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Michael 
Carpenter recently published in Foreign Affairs an article highlighting how the 
 
72 Id. at 690-91. 
73 Id. at 692-93 (finding that, in practice, “there is a conditional protection of testimonial 
privacy subject to basic limits”). 
74 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972) (“[I]mmunity from use and derivative 
use is coextensive with the scope of privilege . . . .”). 
75 See Balsys, 524 U.S. at 693 (“[T]he Judiciary could not recognize fear of foreign prosecution 
and at the same time preserve the Government’s existing rights to seek testimony in exchange for 
immunity . . . .”). 
76 Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Based on Kastigar at 11, 
United States v. Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d 684 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (No. 1:14-cr-00272-JSR). 
77 See United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63, 88 (2d Cir. 2017) (“As to the Government’s concerns 
that a hostile foreign government might hypothetically endeavor to sabotage U.S. prosecutions by 
immunizing a suspect and publishing his or her testimony—that, of course, is not this case.”). 
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Kremlin weaponizes cross-border corruption and financial crime to undermine 
Western democracies.78 By dismissing this significant issue, the Second Circuit 
overlooked a flaw in its attempt to establish a new blanket precedent. The same 
lack of control experienced by U.S. prosecutors in an Allen hypothetical 
parallels their lack of control over foreign use of American-compelled 
testimony as seen in Balsys, an important policy consideration highlighted by 
the Supreme Court.79 
A related policy argument also rejected in Balsys is that the U.S. government’s 
interest in rule of law is adequately served when defendants are convicted abroad 
for their crimes, creating the same incentive for overreach that the Fifth 
Amendment is meant to guard against. The Balsys Court framed the issue as 
using its discretion to expand the coverage of the Fifth Amendment, premised 
on the idea that it will induce our government to adopt international agreements 
to protect defendants from this overreach.80 The Court nevertheless considered 
the potential benefits of such policies to be uncertain, as foreign courts that do 
not recognize any privilege against self-incrimination would still compel 
testimony from U.S. defendants.81 Because a loss of testimony in U.S. trials 
would likely result, and the countervailing benefit of protecting defendants in 
foreign prosecutions is not guaranteed, the Court found that international 
jurisdiction for the Self-Incrimination Clause would not effectively address any 
outstanding incentives for overreach.82 The Second Circuit in Allen suggests, in 
response, that the risk of defendant testimony being invalidated by foreign 
compulsion should fall “on the U.S. Government (should it seek to prosecute 
foreign individuals), rather than on the subjects and targets of cross-border 
investigations.”83 Although this may be the policy judgment of the Second 
Circuit, it does not comport with the Balsys Court’s logic in an analogous situation 
that a remote threat of overreach is outweighed by competing concerns. 
 
78 See generally Joseph R. Biden Jr. & Michael Carpenter, How to Stand Up to the Kremlin: 
Defending Democracy Against Its Enemies, 97 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Jan.–Feb. 2018, at 44 (discussing 
extensive money laundering and other cross-border criminal violations used to promote Russian 
influence abroad). It is no small leap to imagine that, in shielding such activities from U.S. 
prosecutorial scrutiny, the Russian government might launch its own sham corruption investigations 
that would “compel” testimony and thwart U.S. efforts at justice. In such a case, the sham-nature of 
the investigation might not be clear and the foreign relations implications of U.S. courts decrying 
the Russian investigations might even be too steep to merit continued American pursuit of the cases 
regardless of a judicial exception, subtly undermining our own rule of law. 
79 Balsys, 524 U.S. at 693, 697-98 (recognizing that U.S. courts cannot enforce immunity 
abroad and that forcing U.S. courts to consider potential foreign immunity issues would 
unacceptably inhibit U.S. prosecutors’ abilities to offer immunity deals). 
80 Id. at 696-97. 
81 Id. at 697. 
82 Id. at 697-98. 
83 United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63, 88 (2d Cir. 2017). 
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In fact, in an Allen-type scenario, the potential U.S. government incentive 
for overreach is significantly less, given that foreign authorities would be 
those actually compelling the testimony, leaving U.S. law enforcement a further 
step removed from the compulsion, unlike in Balsys, where U.S. authorities were 
themselves doing the compelling. Unless foreign authorities act specifically 
under orders from U.S. authorities or otherwise engage as U.S. agents, there 
would be an insufficient connection to U.S. overreach.84 Here then, the Balsys 
Court’s argument favors inapplicability of the Self-Incrimination Clause to 
foreign testimony. Where two governments are not working perfectly in concert, 
concerns such as these inevitably arise. 
B. Cooperative Internationalism as a Threshold 
The Balsys secondary majority85 alternatively offers a scenario where the 
same-sovereign rule could apply, postulating that foreign and U.S. authorities 
might work closely enough to shift the balance of policy considerations, and 
render the Self-Incrimination Clause to encompass foreign prosecutions. The 
Court defines such a threshold as “cooperative internationalism.”86 The Court 
recognizes that cooperative internationalism may raise concerns “[b]ecause 
the Government now has a significant interest in seeing individuals convicted 
abroad for their crimes, [creating] the same incentive to overreach that has 
required application of the privilege in the domestic context.”87 The Balsys 
Court does not explicitly instruct on when cooperative internationalism 
would be considered fully realized, but suggests that if 
the United States and its allies had enacted substantially similar criminal 
codes aimed at prosecuting offenses of international character, and if it could 
be shown that the United States was granting immunity from domestic 
prosecution for the purpose of obtaining evidence to be delivered to other 
nations as prosecutors of a crime common to both countries, then an 
argument could be made that the Fifth Amendment should apply based on 
fear of foreign prosecution simply because that prosecution was not fairly 
characterized as distinctly “foreign.”88 
 
84 See Balsys, 524 U.S. at 694-95 (rejecting the defendant’s reasoning that foreign prosecutions 
engendered “the same incentive to overreach that has required application of the privilege [against 
self-incrimination] in the domestic context”). 
85 In Balsys, Justices Scalia and Thomas joined five other justices for three parts of the 7–2 
majority opinion. However, they declined to join the parts relevant here, leaving the Court with 
only a 5–4 majority. 
86 Balsys, 524 U.S. at 693. 
87 Id. at 693-94. 
88 Id. at 698. 
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Although this high level of coordination was not found in Balsys, the case 
was decided in 1999. During the intervening decades, international law 
enforcement cooperation has exploded, complete with Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) bodies dedicated to 
coordinating domestic laws on international crimes, such as foreign corruption 
and money laundering, treaties easing evidence sharing and extraditions, and 
more.89 Modern international law enforcement cooperation might cause the 
same court that scoffed at cross-jurisdictional coordination at the time of Balsys 
to unequivocally support the assertion of full Fifth Amendment protections 
beyond U.S. borders today. Notably, cooperation between the United States’ 
Securities and Exchange Commission, the United Kingdom’s Financial 
Conduct Authority, and Canada’s Ontario Securities Commission has been 
significant over the last few years. According to recent reports, 
[s]uch collaboration includes sharing information, including confidential and 
compelled testimony. The SEC has entered into Memoranda of 
Understanding (MOUs) with the FCA and the OSC that provide for the 
exchange of information and cooperation in overseeing corporations, and 
their directors and officers, that conduct business in the respective 
jurisdictions. Further, all three regulators are members of the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), which also provides for 
mutual sharing of information . . . . The United States has also signaled its 
intention to prosecute securities violations that occur extraterritorially. 
Section 929P of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act affirms the SEC’s ability to bring an enforcement action 
against foreign individuals for foreign conduct that has some impact on the 
U.S. markets or investors.90 
In this new world of formalized international cooperation and 
synchronized action, courts may need to address what counts as “cooperative 
internationalism,” and whether or not it carries all of the same consequences 
as the Fourteenth Amendment and the same-sovereign rule when governing 
immunity between state and federal prosecutions. 
 
89 For example, the OECD maintains international standards on anti-corruption and anti-
bribery work, complete with interjurisdictional peer reviews and multilateral surveillance to ensure 
accountability. See What We Do and How, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., 
http://www.oecd.org/about/whatwedoandhow/ [https://perma.cc/Y5XH-LAXH] (listing numerous 
OECD activities of cross-border scope). The U.S. Treasury Department also participates with a 
number of international terrorist financing and financial crime cooperative initiatives. See Terrorism 
and Financial Intelligence, U.S. DEP’T. OF TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/
about/organizational-structure/offices/Pages/Office-of-Terrorism-and-Financial-Intelligence.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/M2UA-9ZYJ] (explaining the role of the office of Terrorism and Financial 
Intelligence in combatting terrorist financing internationally). 
90 See Vukelj & Vesely, supra note 24. 
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Here, the Balsys and Allen analyses could theoretically diverge, as there are 
differences in assessing the degree of cooperation among international law 
enforcement bodies that could be relevant to each context. The differences, 
like who physically conducts the interrogations, could necessitate different 
standards to establish international cooperation as a factor in determining the 
admissibility of foreign government–compelled testimony in U.S. courts. As 
a practical matter, it is also significantly harder to ensure that meticulous U.S. 
standards on information-sharing are met than it is to require U.S. prosecutors 
to negotiate immunity in conjunction with their foreign counterparts.91 A full 
embrace of high standards for a Balsys-type scenario could thus have 
catastrophic policy implications when applied in an Allen-type scenario. Most 
countries, including those currently engaged in international criminal 
cooperation, may not be sufficiently equipped or coordinated with the U.S. to 
handle complex firewall schemes even like the one between the U.S. and the 
U.K. judged insufficient in Allen. As illustrated in Allen, many countries 
protect a right against self-incrimination, but that right can protect different 
behaviors and privileges than it would in the United States.92 Mistakes 
happen, and prosecutors unfamiliar with the U.S. legal system but who want 
to cooperate with U.S. law enforcement can reasonably be expected to err with 
respect to sharing compelled testimony they gather legally under their own 
laws.93 In some cases, foreign law enforcement will ignore U.S. concerns 
altogether in favor of complying solely with their own laws. There is no 
deterrence rationale for U.S. prosecutors in such a situation, except to 
discourage complicated cooperation with foreign counterparts. In the same 
 
91 See Sean Hecker & Karolos Seeger, The Use of Foreign Compelled Testimony in Cross-Border 
Investigations—The Impact of the Second Circuit’s Allen Decision, in THE INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE 
LEGAL GUIDE TO: BUSINESS CRIME 2018 9, 13 (Global Legal Group ed., 8th ed. Sept. 2017), https://
www.debevoise.com/insights/publications/2017/09/the-use-of-foreign-compelled-testimony (“Given the 
potential pitfalls [of coordinating international law enforcement cooperation], if the DOJ is not able to 
take the lead on these cases from the beginning, it may opt not to pursue them at all.”); Quinn Emanuel 
Urquhart Sullivan, LLP, October 2017: Second Circuit Immunity Decision Upends Cross-Border Criminal 
Investigations, JD SUPRA (Nov. 2, 2017), https://advance.lexis.com/document?crid=9296f878-b71c-4c48-
b045-0573972bfb32&pddocfullpath=
%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fnews%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A5PW0-YWN1-JCMN-Y3VK-00000-
00&pdcontentcomponentid=299488&pdalertresultid=732694180&pdalertprofileid=213f1a06-a317-407f-
9899-fc09463b0151&pdmfid=1000516&pdisurlapi=true [https://perma.cc/NZL2-LBPT] (highlighting 
that the Allen decision could place a significantly heavier burden on U.S. prosecutors in every 
investigation where other law enforcement authorities have the legal right to compel testimony). 
92 See generally G. Arthur Martin et al., The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Under Foreign 
Law, 51 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 161 (1960) (discussing the nuances of the 
privilege against self-incrimination as it exists in the legal systems of multiple countries). 
93 See, e.g., United States v. Mundt, 508 F.2d 904, 906 (10th Cir. 1974) (finding admissible 
statements gathered by a Peruvian law enforcement officer, trained in the United States and aware 
of U.S. law, who chose only to follow Peruvian law and ignore American Miranda warnings and 
right to counsel after an arrest).  
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spirit as the warnings of the Balsys Court, this position unduly burdens law 
enforcement trying to prosecute internationally mobile criminals and hurts 
executive branch foreign relations efforts, cutting off potentially fruitful 
cooperation where U.S. prosecutors fear accidental taint by their foreign 
counterparts. For foreign countries, because there is no analog to the Fourteenth 
Amendment in Malloy directly linking a foreign government’s legal obligations 
to the U.S. government’s, this easily becomes an issue of sovereignty. 
Overall, it is worth noting that the Balsys decision has been panned in 
academic circles as misreading Murphy and other precedential cases,94 and as 
flouting international norms and law.95 The case, which comes in a line of 
precedent that has seesawed between Murdock’s narrowness and Murphy’s 
blanket coverage, is not the last word on self-incrimination. However, the 
case does provide relevant guidance when considering the U.S. trial 
admissibility of foreign government–compelled testimony. 
III. OTHER RELEVANT COMPARISONS 
Because of the dearth of case law on this issue, it is useful to draw lessons 
through comparison. Three components of current law are especially salient 
to the Allen context: 1) the implied applicability of Bram v. United States96 and 
that dicta’s acceptance by future Courts, 2) case law surrounding the 
admissibility of Miranda warnings, and 3) an analogous body like Congress 
compelling testimony as seen in United States v. North.97 While there is no 
clear path to determine the international reach of the Fifth Amendment, 
weighing these considerations can guide a new framework for determining 
the admissibility of foreign government–compelled testimony. 
A. Assuming Applicability of the Fifth Amendment to Foreign Testimony 
Dicta from Bram, and, building from it, United States v. Orlandez-Gamboa98 
and Brulay v. United States99, suggest that the Fifth Amendment is applicable 
to foreign government–compelled testimony. In Bram, Canadian authorities 
 
94 See, e.g., Steven J. Winger, Note, Denying Fifth Amendment Protections to Witnesses Facing Foreign 
Prosecutions: Self-Incrimination Discrimination?, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1095, 1129-37 (1999) 
(analyzing the failure of Balsys to adhere to controlling precedents and to give sufficient emphasis to 
essential policies advanced by the Self-Incrimination Clause). 
95 Dianne Marie Amann, The Rights of the Accused in a Global Enforcement Arena, 6 ILSA J. 
INT’L. & COMP. L. 555, 562-63 (2000) (implying that Balsys reflects the absence of international 
norms considered in U.S. constitutional interpretation). 
96 168 U.S. 532 (1897). 
97 910 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1990), withdrawn & superseded in part on reh’g, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. 
Cir. 1990). 
98 320 F.3d 328 (2d Cir. 2003). 
99 383 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1967). 
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coerced a confession in Canada from a suspected murderer before handing him 
over to U.S. prosecutors.100 The Court held that the confession was 
inadmissible because it was compelled, taking for granted that Fifth 
Amendment protections would apply to such evidence though obtained 
independently by foreign authorities.101 Bram is the closest Supreme Court 
case to parallel the situation in Allen, but dicta from 1897 cannot definitively 
address the issue of foreign government–compelled testimony, particularly as 
Balsys might point in the opposite direction. 
Drawing on Bram, the Second Circuit Orlandez-Gamboa case involved a 
Colombian drug cartel leader voluntarily admitting guilt and giving details about 
his dealings to Colombian prosecutors as part of a Colombian reduced-sentencing 
scheme.102 After meetings with the defendant, Colombian prosecutors amended 
the charges to make him eligible for extradition to the United States and for 
prosecution by U.S. authorities for those crimes.103 After extensive discussion, 
the U.S. court found Federal Rule of Evidence 410(4) inapplicable overseas and 
then conducted a voluntariness analysis under the Fifth Amendment, citing 
Bram as precedent but without any discussion on the applicability of the Fifth 
Amendment overseas.104 The juxtaposition of extensive international analysis on 
Rule 410(4) without any on the Fifth Amendment suggests either that the court 
in Orlandez-Gamboa similarly ignored the extraterritorial issue, or, more likely, 
implicitly accepted Bram’s dicta. Interestingly, Orlandez-Gamboa was decided by 
Judge Guido Calabresi, the same judge who wrote the overturned opinion from 
Balsys five years earlier.105 Courts’ previous silence adds little to the argument, a 
point tacitly made in the government’s reply brief which neglected any mention 
of Orlandez-Gamboa.106 
The Ninth Circuit in Brulay v. United States took a slightly different tactic 
in its analysis of Bram’s dicta. In Brulay, Mexican officials detained a defendant, 
seized his amphetamine pills, questioned him, and ultimately extracted 
incriminating statements and evidence from him without the use of any 
 
100 Bram, 168 U.S. at 537. 
101 Id. at 541, 565 (concluding that “an influence was exerted” and “error was committed by the 
trial court in admitting the confession under the circumstances disclosed by the record”). 
102 Orlandez-Gamboa, 320 F.3d at 329. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 332 (holding that Gamboa’s admissions, though potentially inadmissible as evidence 
under Rule 410(4) because they were made during negotiations concerning his sentence, were 
admissible because the rule had no extraterritorial applicability). 
105 United States v. Balsys, 119 F.3d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 1997), rev’d 524 U.S. 666 (1998). Calabresi 
argued in Balsys that there was no “significant difference in the harm to governmental interests from 
granting the privilege to those who fear foreign prosecutions, and to those who fear domestic 
prosecution, because the reasons for allowing the privilege are similar in both situations, and because 
the language of the amendment does not distinguish between the two . . . .” Id. at 140. 
106 Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Based on Kastigar at iv, 
United States v. Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d 684 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (No. 1:14-cr-00272-JSR). 
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coercion.107 The court’s analysis distinguishes between the Fourth Amendment, 
whose protections do not apply to actions by foreign officials, and the Fifth 
Amendment, whose protections do apply per Bram.108 The Court briefly cites 
to the same timing rationale of Chavez,109 which is of limited utility without 
further probing as discussed in subsection II.A.1 of this Comment. In these 
cases and in others like them, the Bram silence is instructive but, particularly 
without any deeper analysis of the issue, not controlling. 
B. Admissibility of Foreign Testimony Without Miranda Warnings 
One scenario where courts have extensively discussed the admissibility of 
foreign-compelled testimony is in the case law surrounding police interrogations 
and their attendant Miranda warnings. Many cases address situations where U.S. 
authorities interrogate suspects abroad, foreign authorities interrogate suspects 
abroad using torture or coercion, or foreign authorities do not give suspects 
Miranda warnings but proceed to extract information from suspects voluntarily. 
Each iteration presents a different constitutionality analysis, but all trace back to 
standards focused on 1) voluntariness and, more broadly, 2) due process. 
1. Analyzing a Voluntariness Standard 
Where U.S. authorities are heavily involved, constitutional protections 
attach. As such, interrogations conducted abroad by U.S. officials trigger Fifth 
Amendment Miranda protections to the extent practicable.110 Where foreign 
authorities conduct the interrogation, voluntary non-Mirandized testimony 
under the Fifth Amendment can still be admissible where it is 1) not the 
product of a joint venture between U.S. and foreign authorities, and 2) not a 
product of tactics that “shock the judicial conscience.”111 
 
107 Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d 345, 349 (9th Cir. 1967). 
108 Id. at 348-49 n.5 (discussing the inapplicability of Fourth Amendment protections due to a 
lack of deterrent effect on U.S. law enforcement and the applicability of Fifth Amendment 
protections because they are triggered by the entrance of evidence into trial). 
109 Id. 
110 See, e.g., United States v. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d 168, 181, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding 
that a bombing suspect questioned abroad by foreign and then U.S. authorities was entitled to be 
Mirandized prior to the interrogation by U.S. authorities). 
111 See United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 146 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that “statements obtained 
under circumstances that ‘shock the judicial conscience’ will be suppressed”); see also Fred Medick, 
Exporting Miranda: Protecting the Right Against Self-Incrimination when U.S. Officers Perform Custodial 
Interrogations Abroad, 44 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 173, 185-86 (2009) (describing the two major 
exceptions to the rule that Fifth Amendment protections against self-incrimination do not protect 
suspects questioned by foreign agents abroad); cf. United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120, 139 (5th 
Cir. 1976) (remarking that appellate courts may exercise their discretionary powers to exclude 
evidence obtained through extreme foreign searches and seizures). 
810 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 166: 789 
The joint venture and “shocks the conscience” exceptions are not of 
particular relevance in an Allen-type context. The joint venture doctrine has 
been articulated by a number of Circuit Courts,112 though no test for what 
constitutes a “joint venture” has been universally adopted.113 It seems to 
underpin the Balsys call for a standard of “cooperative internationalism” 
discussed in Section II.B of this Comment. The joint venture doctrine is 
informative in cases with close international cooperation but is not dispositive 
as to the admissibility of foreign-compelled testimony writ large. The “shocks 
the conscience” doctrine also does not apply in an Allen-type context. Many 
of these cases directly address coerced confessions through alleged torture.114 
By contrast, in Allen, U.K. authorities did nothing to “shock the conscience” 
of a U.S. court or otherwise coerce defendants.115 Moreover, it seems an odd 
contradiction that only voluntary statements taken in such a way as to shock 
judicial conscience are excluded from evidence, because arguably any such 
statement should be prima facie involuntary under the applicable definitions 
of voluntary discussed below.116 In an Allen-type case then, the key parallel to 
the Miranda cases centers on only the voluntariness question. 
Read aggressively, the voluntariness standard could constitutionally 
invalidate all foreign government–compelled testimony.117 The first order 
question, then, is whether a voluntariness standard applies at all. Although it 
has been commonly assumed that it does,118 that has not previously been 
 
112 See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1225 (9th Cir. 1988), rev’d 494 U.S. 
259 (1990) (identifying cases in the Second, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits that all 
engage joint venture doctrine). Although these are Fourth Amendment cases, the joint venture 
doctrine analysis is the same under both Amendments. See e.g., In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. 
Embassies in E. Africa, 552 F.3d 177, 203 (2d Cir. 2008) (discussing the joint venture doctrine in the 
context of Fifth Amendment claims). 
113 Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1225. (“The few courts that have considered the question of how 
much American participation in a foreign search and seizure is required to mandate application of the 
exclusionary rule have not been unanimous in their choice of the precise test to be applied—though 
they have as a statistical matter been virtually unanimous in rejecting claims of undue participation.” 
(quoting United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120, 140 (5th Cir.1976) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
114 See, e.g., United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 227-28, 232-33 (4th Cir. 2008) (affirming 
the district court’s finding that defendant’s statements were voluntary because he was not subject to 
torture, and finding no credible evidence that there was “improper collaboration” between Saudi 
and U.S. officials in defendant’s detention); Yousef, 327 F.3d at  144 (holding that defendant waived 
his argument—that his post-arrest statements were coerced as a result of torture—when he failed to 
raise the argument in a pre-trial suppression motion). 
115 United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63, 82 (2d Cir. 2017) (“[T]he defendant’s testimony was 
compelled by foreign officials lawfully—that is, pursuant to foreign legal process—in a manner that 
does not shock the conscience or violate fundamental fairness.”).  
116 The Second Circuit acknowledged this “far-fetched” scenario and backpedaled from its 
“shocks the conscience” exception in the Allen decision. Allen, 864 F.3d at 84 n.90. 
117 Indeed, this is the intended outcome of the Second Circuit’s Allen decision. See id. at 82. 
118 See, e.g., Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at 227-28 (“[V]oluntary statements obtained from a defendant by 
foreign law enforcement officers, even without Miranda warnings, generally are admissible.”); Kilday 
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explicitly held, as the D.C. Circuit pointed out in United States v. Straker.119 
Assuming it does, courts need to address the definition of involuntariness and 
whether it encapsulates legal foreign compulsion (as in Allen) in addition to 
coercion. If involuntariness includes both, courts need to decide whether to 
carve out an exception to admit such involuntary statements compelled in 
accordance with foreign law without coercion. The current voluntariness 
standard is a reflection of the ambiguous evolution of Fifth Amendment due 
process jurisprudence,120 so arguments about its applicability are not clear cut. 
The emphasis on voluntariness by courts does not necessarily imply that 
involuntary statements legally compelled by foreign officials are never 
admissible. United States v. Yousef121, an oft-cited case in the foreign interrogation 
space, evidences the contradictions that can arise from this disconnect. Yousef was 
a Second Circuit terrorism case related to the 1993 World Trade Center 
bombings, where questioning occurred on foreign soil, first by local authorities 
and then by U.S. officials.122 The court found Miranda warnings irrelevant to the 
admissibility of evidence from foreign police interrogations where the 
defendant’s statements were voluntary.123 However, Yousef and similar cases 
(including all nine cited by the Second Circuit as evidence that this question is 
already settled124) never addressed the core issue of an arguably involuntary 
 
v. United States, 481 F.2d 655, 656 (5th Cir. 1973) (“[T]he statements were not coerced . . . . The 
evidence was therefore admissible.”). 
119 United States v. Straker, 800 F.3d 570, 614 n.16 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“We have never decided 
what standard determines the admissibility of statements obtained abroad by foreign police officers, 
though it has been suggested that the ordinary voluntariness standard governs.”). 
120 See GOV’T PUBL’G OFFICE, FIFTH AMENDMENT: RIGHTS OF PERSONS 1536-38 (2014) 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CONAN-REV-2014/pdf/GPO-CONAN-REV-2014-10-6.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BNG3-FRGM] [hereinafter FIFTH AMENDMENT: RIGHTS OF PERSONS] (documenting 
the evolution of the voluntariness standard and due process under the Self-Incrimination Clause). 
121 327 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2003). 
122 Id. at 78-83. 
123 Id. at 145. Note that the government’s Allen brief also raises the idea that Yousef was based on 
questionable case law. Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Based on Kastigar 
at 21, 21 n.9, United States v. Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d 684 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (No. 1:14-cr-00272-JSR). 
124 See United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63, 80 nn.67-68 (2d Cir. 2017). The citations from the 
Second Circuit opinion are Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897); In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. 
Embassies in E. Africa, 552 F.3d 177, 200 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 232 (4th 
Cir. 2008); United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 124, 145 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Wolf, 813 F.2d 
970, 972 n.3 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Mundt, 508 F.2d 904, 906 (10th Cir. 1974); Kilday v. United 
States, 481 F.2d 655, 656 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Welch, 455 F.2d 211, 213 (2d Cir. 1972); and 
Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d 345, 349 n.5 (9th Cir. 1967). Bram and Brulay are both discussed in 
Section III.A of this Comment as implying Fifth Amendment applicability without any analysis on 
the issue. Abu Ali, In re Terrorist Bombings, Yousef, and Kilday all address the coercion issue with regards 
to Miranda warnings and are cited in subsection III.B.1. Welch, Wolf, and Mundt deal with similar 
coercion questions from Miranda warnings case law, and are far from dispositive here. Welch relies 
explicitly on the Bram dicta as a basis for excluding involuntary statements, but finds that a lack of 
Miranda warnings was not sufficient grounds for exclusion. 455 F.2d at 213. Mundt analyzes statements 
for involuntariness on the basis of whether they involved “threats or coercion . . . deprivation of food, 
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statement taken by foreign officials without coercion, ignoring a potential 
distinction between coerced and compelled statements.125 
As alluded to in the government brief in Allen,126 the Supreme Court in 
Colorado v. Connelly recognizes the importance of “coercive activity of the 
State” as the catalyst for a finding of involuntariness.127 In domestic case law, 
coercion can be as simple as threatening to fire an employee.128 When 
referencing involuntariness in the foreign interrogation context, the example 
cases cited in Yousef refer to circumstances that involve extreme physical 
harm.129 Courts in other foreign interrogation cases have envisioned 
involuntariness as physical or psychological coercion, meaning beatings less 
than torture, extended detentions, keeping defendants ignorant of their rights, 
and otherwise wearing down their physical and mental wellbeing.130 
Interestingly, most of the examples involve recently apprehended individuals 
detained and questioned alone. All of this is a far cry from white collar formal 
judicial proceedings, where the compelled individuals have lawyers, like in 
Allen.131 Without a full interrogation of involuntariness, this foreign 
 
sleep or toilet facilities.” 508 F.2d at 906. Wolf involves allegations of coercion by a threat of “physical 
violence.” 813 F.2d at 972. Of note, Yousef and In re Terrorist Bombings are both decisions by Judge 
Cabranes, who wrote the final Second Circuit Allen opinion. 
125 This issue was originally raised in the DOJ’s Allen brief. See Memorandum in Opposition 
to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Based on Kastigar at 21, United States v. Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d 
684 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (No. 1:14-cr-00272-JSR) (“[The relevant cases don’t] address[] the admissibility 
of potentially involuntary statements taken by foreign officials.”). However, the Second Circuit 
rejected the argument. Allen, 864 F.3d at 82 (“[W]e have often referred to the Fifth Amendment’s 
prohibition against illicit use as encompassing ‘involuntary,’ rather than ‘compelled,’ statements. But 
this semantic distinction does not bear significant, much less dispositive, weight.”). 
126 Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Based on Kastigar at 21 n.9, 
United States v. Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d 684 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (No. 1:14-cr-00272-JSR) (“[T]he 
introduction of evidence into a judicial proceeding does not by itself satisfy the ‘state action’ 
requirement for triggering the constitutional protection against involuntary confessions.”). 
127 479 U.S. 157, 165 (1986). 
128 See Akhil Reed Amar & Renée B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination 
Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 868, 868 n.29 (1995) (summarizing case law finding termination of 
government employment to be unconstitutional compulsion). 
129 United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 146 (2d Cir. 2003) (identifying the rubbing of pepper 
in the eyes as conduct that “shocks the judicial conscience,” warranting suppression (citing United 
States v. Nagelberg, 434 F.2d 585, 587 n.1 (2d Cir. 1970))). 
130 See e.g., United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 240 (4th Cir. 2008) (analyzing the defendant’s 
voluntariness in the context of his subjection to physical or psychological coercion, highlighting that 
he was not blindfolded, shackled, or denied basic necessities during his interrogation); In re Terrorist 
Bombings of U.S. Embassies in East Africa v. Odeh, 552 F.3d 177, 214 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing to the 
intellectual capabilities and lack of threats or promises to the defendant as evidence his statements 
were voluntary); United States v. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d 168, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding an 
absence of coercion where the defendant faced interrogation sessions of reasonable duration, was not 
handcuffed, was confident and well-educated, and received breaks for basic needs). 
131 The distinction is made explicit in Abu Ali, where the court rejected the defendant’s 
constitutional claim for suppression of statements he made in Saudi custody. Although the 
defendant was not provided legal protections like prompt presentment and Miranda warnings in 
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compulsion/coercion distinction is ignored. An Allen-type situation, where 
that distinction could decide the case, highlights the importance of thoroughly 
considering the admissibility of foreign, legally compelled statements. 
The four primary concerns with a voluntariness standard generally suggest that 
Allen-type foreign-compelled testimony should be admissible, either as voluntary 
testimony or as an exception to the voluntariness standard, but there is significant 
room for disagreement. The concerns are 1) upholding the moral rationales for the 
Fifth Amendment, 2) respecting foreign sovereignty, 3) recognizing the limited 
deterrence impacts, and 4) determining the reliability of evidence gathered 
through self-incrimination. The moral justifications for the Fifth Amendment 
are robust but not particularly well-defined.132 They include protecting 
individuals from the “cruel trilemma” of self-accusing, perjury, or contempt; 
safeguarding the mental privacy of the accused; and respecting the integrity of 
the individual by not turning him into an “instrument” to be used against himself; 
among others.133 Although the Supreme Court in Balsys rejected similar notions 
as Pollyannaish,134 the moral concerns are real where foreign governments compel 
testimony. Fifth Amendment protection itself is not absolute, as individuals can 
trade immunity for testimony, but immunity eliminates the moral quandary of 
the trilemma. Where foreign governments do not offer such relief, there may be 
serious moral questions about whether their compelled testimony, even in 
accordance with their justice system, should be admitted. 
The issue of respecting foreign sovereignty weighs towards admitting 
foreign-compelled statements. Foreign affairs is traditionally left by courts to 
the executive branch,135 and imposing strict admissibility standards on 
foreign-compelled testimony would hinder U.S. international law 
enforcement cooperation and U.S. relations where foreign and U.S. 
authorities were independently pursuing related crimes. The costs would 
come as they did in Allen, with the U.S. government forced to expend 
significant financial and diplomatic capital training foreign partners in how 
to assist U.S. officials in their constitutional compliance.136 The struggle 
comes where foreign legal systems allow for procedures that, to American 
eyes, look patently unjust. In those cases, respecting foreign sovereignty in 
American courts is a more complex question, but one that arguably remains 
 
accordance with the U.S. Constitution, the court saw “the absence of these protections as [merely] 
one factor in the totality of circumstances in evaluating whether Abu Ali made his statements 
voluntarily,” in deference to Saudi Arabian sovereignty. 528 F.3d at 233. 
132 See Amar & Lettow, supra note 128, at 889-90 (“None of the rationales typically given for 
the Self-Incrimination Clause can satisfactorily explain the current scope of the privilege and its 
relation to the rest of our legal and moral system.”). 
133 Id. at 889-92 (discussing various rationales for the Fifth Amendment). 
134 See supra subsection II.A.3. 
135 See supra note 67. 
136 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
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in the realm of foreign affairs and the executive branch.137 Out of respect for 
the judicial systems of other countries, or at least those with similar legal 
systems, there is an argument that testimony following their judicial 
procedures should be admitted. 
The deterrence rationale, which doesn’t seem to apply here, is often cited 
in the Miranda cases for admitting voluntary, non-Mirandized statements. 
Because the United States cannot compel a foreign sovereign to follow U.S. 
constitutional requirements in their investigations, enforcing the requirement 
would have no deterrent effect on law enforcement overreach.138 In cases like 
Allen, the same rationale applies because foreign governments cannot 
generally be expected to forego privileges under their own laws out of 
deference to U.S. law enforcement investigations. Under certain 
circumstances, U.S. prosecutors may persuade friendly foreign authorities to 
follow protocols designed to preserve Fifth Amendment protections, but this 
is an unrealistic expectation where U.S. prosecutors do not have complete 
control over governmental actions related to the U.S. prosecutors’ evidence 
and witnesses.139 As has consistently been held with Miranda warnings, a 
foreign law enforcement body, which is not bound by the Fifth Amendment 
or any other U.S. constitutional provisions, simply will not be deterred by U.S. 
standards on voluntariness, and neither will U.S. authorities be deterred from 
unconstitutional conduct by imposing this burden on an independent party. 
At the same time, the voluntariness issue in Allen is distinct from Miranda 
warnings because it speaks directly to the reliability of the evidence in 
question.140 Where robust immunity, like that available under the U.S. 
Constitution, is not granted to the accused, they remain highly incentivized to 
perjure themselves. Although an Allen situation does not threaten the type of 
coerced false confessions that originated self-incrimination protections,141 it 
 
137 The U.S. legal system encourages weighing the credibility of testimony at trial, but the 
potential for prejudice such evidence represents could outweigh any value it provided at trial. 
138 See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 166 (1986) (“The purpose of excluding evidence 
seized in violation of the Constitution is to substantially deter future violations of the 
Constitution.”). See, e.g., Kilday v. United States, 481 F.2d 655, 656 (5th Cir. 1973) (noting that the 
U.S. Constitution cannot compel foreign sovereigns to take specific actions); United States v. Welch, 
455 F.2d 211, 213 (2d Cir. 1972) (acknowledging that Miranda requirements have almost no deterrent 
effect on foreign police officers); United States v. Chavarria, 443 F.2d 904, 905 (9th Cir. 1971) 
(“[T]he exclusionary rule has little or no effect upon the conduct of foreign police.”). 
139 Cf. supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
140 See Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Based on Kastigar at 21 
n.9, United States v. Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d 684 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (No. 1:14-cr-00272-JSR) (“[A] court 
‘must exclude’ an involuntary statement ‘because of its inherent unreliability.’” (quoting United 
States v. Welch, 455 F.2d 211, 213 (2d Cir. 1972))). 
141 See Amar & Lettow, supra note 128, at 923 (highlighting the high probability of unreliable 
confessions in 1789). See generally FIFTH AMENDMENT: RIGHTS OF PERSONS, supra note 120 
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still distorts incentives to honesty that our justice system generally 
promotes.142 As previously mentioned, countries with seemingly unjust legal 
practices could also taint the reliability of evidence even where collected in 
accordance with their own due process procedures. The right answers are far 
from clear, as is the weight this voluntariness distinction should be granted 
when evaluating the admissibility of foreign government–compelled 
testimony. However, current case law leaves open the possibility of a legal 
distinction between compelled and coerced testimony, and there are policy 
reasons relevant to voluntariness that weigh toward making such a distinction. 
2. Due Process Under the Self-Incrimination Clause 
Within a voluntary analysis and without, the core constitutional issue is 
whether defendants receive due process. The Self-Incrimination Clause reads 
that no accused person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself . . . without due process of law.”143 A plain text reading of the 
Clause suggests that once a person has received due process, she can be forced to 
testify against herself. From a purely textualist perspective then, Allen-type 
situations hinge on whether another country’s administration of its own formal 
due process, which doesn’t perfectly map onto American due process 
jurisprudence, creates the type of involuntariness that would render such 
testimony inadmissible. The Supreme Court has held that due process guarantees 
not particular forms of procedures, but the very substance of individual rights 
to life, liberty, and property . . . . It follows that any legal proceeding enforced 
by public authority, whether sanctioned by age and custom, or newly devised 
in the discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the general public 
good, which regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must 
be held to be due process of law . . . . In all cases, that kind of procedure is due 
process of law which is suitable and proper to the nature of the case, and 
sanctioned by the established customs and usages of the courts. What is unfair 
in one situation may be fair in another. The precise nature of the interest that 
has been adversely affected, the manner in which this was done, the reasons 
for doing it, the available alternatives to the procedure that was followed, the 
protection implicit in the office of the functionary whose conduct is 
 
(discussing the history of the self-incrimination privilege and referencing that six states after the 
American Revolution included protections against self-incrimination in their constitutions). 
142 For example, through laws against perjury and oaths to tell the truth taken by witnesses. 
143 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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challenged, the balance of hurt complained of and good accomplished—these 
are some of the considerations that must enter into the judicial judgment.144 
Foreign legal systems, like the UK government and the authority it grants 
the FCA, arguably meet this broad definition of due process when they 
compel self-incrimination. To be sure, not all foreign governments will, and 
for both political and practical reasons it is hard to draw a line between those 
governments that evince due process and those that don’t. Managing such 
inconsistencies is difficult, but it is an important consideration for a 
voluntariness standard and for the ultimate question of constitutionality of 
foreign government procedures. 
C. Congressionally Compelled Testimony 
A final, potentially fruitful comparison comes from United States v. 
North,145 which analyzes protections against self-incrimination in the context 
of compelled testimony during a congressional investigation. 146 North offers 
one example of constitutional protections constraining a non-traditional law 
enforcement actor outside of the executive branch, potentially useful when 
situating foreign authorities on the broad spectrum of standards of conduct 
constitutionally prescribed to different entities.147 For example, while 
investigations by public employers also invoke Fifth Amendment 
protections,148 courts have rejected any privilege in the context of private 
employers or other private parties.149 As attempted by the Second Circuit in 
 
144 FIFTH AMENDMENT: RIGHTS OF PERSONS, supra note 120, at 1546 (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (citing to multiple accepted Supreme Court precedents regarding the definition of due process). 
145 910 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1990), withdrawn and superseded in part on reh’g, 920 F.2d 940 
(D.C. Cir. 1990). 
146 While the North cases are discussed in relation to Allen, none of the Allen case materials 
considered the constitutional parallels between foreign governments and Congress in depth, instead 
focusing on North’s implications for the taint wall in this case. See United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 
63, 93 (2d Cir. 2017) (analyzing the Government’s ability to meet its Kastigar burden based on the 
North standard). In North, the standard put forward was a “total prohibition” on prosecutorial 
exposure to immunized testimony, including the most tenuous witness exposure. United States v. 
North, 920 F.2d 940, 941-42 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
147 Other courts criticize the strictness with which the D.C. Circuit in North applied standards 
for judging taint, potentially limiting the universality of this analysis. See Amar & Lettow, supra 
note 128, at 879-80. 
148 See J. Michael McGuinness, Fifth Amendment Protection for Public Employees: Garrity and Limited 
Constitutional Protections from Use of Employer Coerced Statements in Internal Investigations and Practical 
Considerations, 24 TOURO L. REV. 697, 705-09 (2008) (describing Fifth Amendment protections for 
public sector workers established by the Supreme Court in Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967)). 
149 See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 166 (1986) (“The most outrageous behavior by a 
private party seeking to secure evidence against a defendant does not make that evidence 
inadmissible under the Due Process Clause.”). 
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Allen, foreign officials must now be situated within this spectrum,150 and North 
provides a useful analogy.151 
In North, congressional testimony compelled through a grant of immunity 
under 18 U.S.C. § 6002 was given during a recess of grand jury proceedings.152 
Pertinent to the highly publicized Iran–Contra scandal,153 the immunized 
testimony was widely broadcast by media outlets and deemed sufficient to 
taint the grand jurors and witnesses.154 Prior to North, the Supreme Court had 
made clear that Fifth Amendment protections apply to testimony before 
legislative committees.155 Under § 6002, Congress can unilaterally grant 
criminal immunity for statements made in its committee hearings to compel 
self-incriminating testimony.156 Although § 6002 is a statutory protection, the 
protection is coextensive with constitutional Fifth Amendment protections.157 
North highlights the uncertain status of a foreign government, as opposed to 
a domestic government entity, compelling testimony that might impact U.S. 
trials. Based on North’s espoused values of resisting tyranny and avoiding the 
cruel expediency of forcing a confession,158 foreign officials should be covered 
by Fifth Amendment protections. Congress and foreign authorities are similar 
in that both are government entities with sovereign powers that can induce the 
 
150 Allen, 864 F.3d at 84-85. 
151 This Comment intentionally ignores the Department of Justice’s analogy of a foreign government 
to the private sector because it was well developed in the record and the Second Circuit compellingly 
distinguishes sovereign power from the power of a private entity. The Second Circuit stated:  
Only sovereign power exposes “those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of 
self-accusation, perjury or contempt.” Only the U.K. government could have 
immunized Defendants (neither of whom were employed by Rabobank at the time), 
compelling them to testify or go to jail. To the extent there may be an “official/private 
action spectrum,” when foreign authorities compel testimony they are acting in the 
quintessence of their sovereign authority, not in their capacity as a mere employer, 
and thus their compulsion is cognizable by the Fifth Amendment (when testimony so 
compelled is used in a U.S. trial).  
Id. at 85 (emphasis in original) (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 
U.S. 52, 55 (1964); and then quoting Geoffrey S. Corn & Kevin Cieply, The Admissibility of Confessions 
Compelled by Foreign Coercion: A Compelling Question of Values in an Era of Increasing International 
Criminal Cooperation, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 467, 476 (2015)). 
152 United States v. North, 910 F.2d, 843, 851, 857 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
153 See id. at 851 (detailing the establishment of congressional investigations following public 
revelations of U.S. arms sales to Iran to fund guerrilla fighters in Nicaragua). 
154 See id. at 863-65, 871-73 (remanding the case and requiring the prosecution to affirmatively 
prove that the DOJ’s investigation was not tainted by witness, prosecutor, and grand juror exposure 
to publicly broadcast testimony). The decision was upheld by United States v. North, 910 F.2d 940 
(D.C. Cir. 1990). 
155 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 195-96 (1957) (recognizing the privilege against 
self-incrimination before a legislative committee). 
156 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1994). 
157 North, 910 F.2d at 853-54 (citing Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972)). 
158 Id. 
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imprisonment of individuals.159 Both are similarly situated vis-à-vis U.S. law 
enforcement authorities in that neither holds formal law enforcement powers in 
the U.S. justice system but both can coordinate formally with U.S. federal law 
enforcement. Finally, both presumably share the previously decried incentive 
towards tyranny and overreach of authority stemming from their efforts to 
govern, maintain their political legitimacy, and bring criminals to justice. 
At the same time, there are significant differences between Congress and 
foreign authorities relevant to an Allen-type analysis. The level of internal 
control or coordination present within the U.S. government is (hopefully) 
stronger than external coordination, where it is relatively uncommon to 
consider foreign law enforcement as engaged in a “joint venture” with U.S. 
authorities.160 Here, Congress was able to pass § 6002 specifically immunizing 
testimony it receives, binding and directing U.S. law enforcement action in a 
way that foreign partners can’t and shouldn’t. In addition, contempt of 
Congress charges allow Congress to use U.S. law to imprison or otherwise 
pressure individuals into compliance with congressional subpoenas through 
judicial and executive branch cooperation, suggesting a significant level of 
coordination not available to foreign law enforcement.161 
The disconnect here highlights a key distinction between U.S. and 
international entities and their prerogatives. Like U.S. law enforcement 
authorities, Congress serves American interests. Foreign authorities do not. 
Diverging goals can mean different targets for prosecution and different 
perspectives on the legality or culpability of actions, even where our 
countries’ policy incentives are somewhat aligned.162 The factual setup of 
North presents an illustrative hypothetical.163 If the Nicaraguan National 
Assembly had broadcast the incriminating statements relevant in North 
instead of the U.S. Congress, U.S. prosecutors could similarly find their 
prosecutorial efforts scuttled, but this time in the interests of another country, 
 
159 See, e.g., TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34097, CONGRESS’S CONTEMPT 
POWER AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL SUBPOENAS: LAW, HISTORY, PRACTICE, 
AND PROCEDURE 11 (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34097.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ND5-
2WZT] (discussing penalties, including imprisonment, for convictions of contempt of Congress as 
initiated by congressional investigators). 
160 Joint ventures under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence trigger enhanced constitutional 
protections for defendants. See Amy E. Pope, Lawlessness Breeds Lawlessness: A Case for Applying the 
Fourth Amendment to Extraterritorial Searches, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1917, 1926-29 (2013). 
161 See supra note 91 (discussing the practical difficulties of convincing non-U.S. entities to 
voluntarily adhere to robust U.S. legal standards); note 149 (addressing a parallel context in which 
Congress was able to use its statutorily granted authority, which would be enforced by the U.S. 
executive and judicial branches of government, to compel testimony). 
162 Clearly the concerns are even greater when dealing with a hostile nation. See supra notes 
77–79 and accompanying text. 
163 Interestingly, this is the type of concerning hypothetical the Second Circuit declined to 
analyze in United States v. Allen. 864 F.3d 63, 86 (2d Cir. 2017). 
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rather than for an American conception of justice. Under this analogy, the 
extension of Fifth Amendment protections would hinge on our trust in the 
good faith of foreign partners and the consideration they will show to 
American interests in justice. As such, the answers congressional compulsion 
provides on the ultimate Allen constitutionality issue are limited. 
North highlights the gray area between government and third-party 
compulsion into which foreign governments seem to fall, recalling from Balsys 
the idea of a threshold measure for finding cooperative internationalism.164 
Although analogous cases are useful, there are no perfect comparisons to 
guide an analysis of the admissibility of foreign government–compelled 
testimony in U.S. trials outside of the Second Circuit’s Allen decision. 
IV. EXAMINING SOLUTIONS 
In light of the underdeveloped doctrine surrounding foreign 
government–compelled testimony and its admissibility in U.S. prosecutions, 
courts will soon need to articulate clearer legal standards to handle this issue. 
I assess six possible solutions along an approximate spectrum of the least to 
the most aggressive enforcement of the self-incrimination privilege: A) 
interpreting to its extreme the DOJ’s Allen position that the privilege against 
self-incrimination should not apply abroad; B) allowing for testimony 
gathered in accordance with local laws; C) allowing for testimony where U.S. 
prosecutors made reasonable efforts to avoid taint under U.S. constitutional 
standards; D) creating a “cooperative internationalism” standard; E) 
establishing a hybrid option from these paths that I recommend to best balance 
constitutional concerns; and F) maintaining the Second Circuit’s outright 
prohibition on testimony that does not meet U.S. constitutional standards. 
Some of these standards offer more practicable, fair outcomes than others, and 
some offer positive elements that I attempt to incorporate into the broader 
hybrid option. Above all, the six solutions highlight that administering proper 
justice can require coming to terms with the fact that justice does not always 
lend itself to black-and-white rules. As one example, the Second Circuit’s 
acknowledgment that its standard specifically does not address a 
government-posed hypothetical of foreign sabotage exposes its weakness as an 
ostensibly universal standard.165 In the context of self-incrimination abroad, 
the challenge is finding clear standards that fit all contexts. 
 
164 See supra Section II.B. 
165 Allen, 864 F.3d at 88 (rejecting the Government’s concerns about foreign sabotage as not 
relevant to the Allen case specifically when ruling on the admissibility of compelled testimony). 
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A. Declining to Apply U.S. Constitutional Protections Abroad 
An extreme approach courts could take would be to allow all testimony 
from abroad, compelled and otherwise, into U.S. trials. This is not a likely 
nor advisable scenario, for the very reasons this Comment has struggled to 
define how best to serve American policy prerogatives—the admissibility of 
compelled testimony is a complex and ethically fraught issue. The option is 
important to include as a starting point in the spectrum of potential courses 
of action for U.S. courts, but its utility ends there given the American value 
placed on constitutional protections. 
B. Basing Self-Incrimination on the Laws of Foreign Partners 
One potential line is where foreign governments have an equivalent to the 
U.S. Constitution’s Fifth Amendment, U.S. authorities would be expected to 
use only testimony that meets the other government’s legal standards. Such a 
standard would guard against the moral concerns about foreign sovereigns who 
entirely lack protections, raised in subsection III.B.1, because a U.S. court would 
still determine whether the foreign sovereign offered protections sufficient to 
be considered “due process.” Once that threshold is met, the standard could be 
similar to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)166 context, where the 
government can only prosecute bribes that would also be considered bribery 
under both the law of the foreign country and under the FCPA.167 By adapting 
our law to that of foreign countries, we would eliminate the possibility that a 
hostile government could manipulate their own laws to obstruct a U.S. 
prosecution.168 In addition, we would be effectively balancing the policy 
consideration that foreign relations, including telling other countries how to 
conduct their criminal investigations, should be left to the political branches.169 
 
166 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1–dd-3 (2012). 
167 Established by Congress in 1988, the FCPA “Local Law Defense” requires the defendant 
“establish that the payment was lawful under the foreign country’s written laws and regulations at 
the time of the offense.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CRIMINAL DIV. & SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N ENF’T 
DIV., A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 23 (Nov. 14, 2012), 
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-resource-guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/6AYK-DBA4]. 
168 See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text. 
169 See United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 697 (1998) (highlighting that powers with respect 
to foreign relations are specifically enumerated to the political branches under Article II, § 2, cl. 2 
of the U.S. Constitution). Note that this is also the rationale used for courts to sidestep scrutiny of 
extraditions to foreign partners on the basis of torture or other unconstitutional 
procedures/treatment. See John T. Parry, International Extradition, The Rule of Non-Inquiry, and the 
Problem of Sovereignty, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1973, 1975 (2010). As such, a local law deference standard 
would be consistent with U.S. policy in other contexts. 
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At the same time, because different governments conceive of the 
protection against self-incrimination in dramatically different ways,170 Fifth 
Amendment protections would be left open to confusion and vulnerable to 
circumvention by close international law enforcement cooperation, especially 
if the “due process” sufficiency standard was overly relaxed. In Allen there was 
significant discussion of the nature of immunity offered by U.K. regulators to 
Robson and the requirement that he review what in the U.S. would be 
considered tainted testimony.171 Such fact-specific nuances would then impact 
testimony’s Fifth Amendment protections, forcing U.S. prosecutors to argue 
the intricacies of other countries’ privileges against self-incrimination.172 
Worse, U.S. prosecutors could instruct their foreign counterparts to ask a list 
of specific questions prohibited by the Fifth Amendment but allowed under 
their own laws, and then send the answers to U.S. prosecutors. If a foreign 
partner did not have what judges would consider sufficient “due process” 
protections, this proposal could preclude formal cooperation and evidence 
sharing altogether. Human rights advocates might argue this to be a positive 
outcome, including its resulting pressure on regimes without due process, but 
it puts a tremendous strain on U.S. law enforcement where they attempt to 
hold criminals accountable already taking advantage of other countries’ rule of 
law challenges.173 Furthermore, this approach would condition American 
constitutional rights on the laws of other countries, which would have negative 
implications for our sovereignty and the strength and consistency of our 
constitutional protections. Taken alone then, this option creates serious 
problems for the sanctity of American values. 
 
170 See supra note 92. 
171 See United States v. Allen, 160 F. Supp.3d 684, 688-90 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (noting that the ruling 
in Kastigar affords “immunity from both direct use and derivative use of [their] compelled testimony”). 
172 Certainly prosecutors could get official advisory opinions from their foreign counterparts under 
current practice, but the struggle of parsing out the nuance in whether other countries have “substantially 
similar” immunity practices and whether those practices are “substantially similar” in a particular case 
would create significant fact-specific uncertainty. See, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 492 
(9th Cir. 1987) (allowing for a good faith exception where U.S. authorities relied on assurances of 
propriety from counterparts in the Philippines); United States v. Ramcharan, No. 04-20065-CRSEITZ, 
2008 WL 170377, at *9 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 14, 2008), aff ’d, 353 F. App’x 419 (11th Cir. 2009) (observing that 
U.S. officials properly relied on assurances about Bahamanian wiretap law from local authorities). 
173 For example, U.S. law enforcement often cooperates with Saudi Arabian and Israeli 
authorities on national security issues that can turn into criminal prosecutions. If either country was 
judged to compel testimony in contravention of due process protections, U.S. prosecutors might shy 
away from partnerships fearing that compelled testimony they gathered might taint a future U.S. 
criminal investigation or U.S. witnesses at trial. 
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C. Allowing Testimony After Reasonable Efforts Against Taint 
Alternatively, formal law enforcement cooperation in investigations could 
be exempted from scrutiny as long as U.S. investigators do not intentionally 
direct foreign investigators to obtain evidence that would otherwise be 
considered unconstitutional. An underlying assumption of this policy would 
be that the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination applies abroad, 
but reasonable best efforts by prosecutors to avoid compelled testimony could 
cure otherwise irreparably tainted testimony. In the Allen case, rather than a 
full separate filter team of attorneys174, the Department of Justice might have 
satisfied their burden with, perhaps as one example, clear and consistent 
requests to Robson that he not share information from the Conti and Allen 
transcripts, as well as meetings with the U.K. authorities explaining what 
information could or could not be shared. 
As examples, a potential “reasonable efforts” standard for international 
law enforcement cooperation could be modeled on Upjohn warnings175 or 
Jencks Act disclosures.176 Upjohn warnings require lawyers representing 
companies to make clear to individual employees that they do not represent 
the individuals themselves but only their employer.177 The standard for clearly 
communicating Upjohn warnings to a corporation’s employees seems 
appropriate because much of the efforts by U.S. prosecutors to avoid taint 
will be good faith, clear communication with foreign authorities about what 
is/isn’t acceptable under U.S. law.178 The “good faith efforts” framework could 
also be informed by the international applicability of Jencks Act disclosures, 
wherein prosecutors are expected by some courts to make good faith efforts 
to obtain copies of prosecution witness statements in the possession of 
 
174 See Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Based on Kastigar at 2 
n.1, United States v. Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d 684 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (No. 1:14-cr-00272-JSR). 
175 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). 
176 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2012). 
177 See JONATHAN BEN-ASHER, AM. BAR ASS’N, ISSUES IN INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS 
OF EXECUTIVES 14-17 (2017), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/labor_law/
2017/03/err/papers/issues_in_internal_investigations.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/55D6-
RXDH] (outlining the obligations of Upjohn warnings and their traditional components as laid 
out in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and by the American Bar Association). 
178 As outlined in the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 4.3, the company’s 
lawyer “shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested. When the lawyer knows or 
reasonably should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer’s role in the 
matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding. The lawyer shall 
not give legal advice to an unrepresented person, other than the advice to secure counsel, if the 
lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the interests of such a person are or have a reasonable 
possibility of being in conflict with the interests of the client.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 4.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
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foreign governments.179 However, that analogy is constrained by the 
complexities in Jencks Act case law.180 
Any form of a “reasonable best efforts” test has interesting implications for 
law enforcement. Because of the heavy Kastigar burden on the prosecution, 
avoiding such a hearing would also save judicial resources without detracting 
from the goal of preventing government overreach. The threat of a Kastigar 
hearing would encourage good faith efforts by prosecutors, but accidental 
missteps by foreign counterparts would not occasion a mistrial or concern U.S. 
investigators to the point of diverting departmental resources to establish brand 
new filter teams to support a case. This proposal would keep control, and 
responsibility, entirely under the purview of U.S. law enforcement authorities, 
stopping the inevitable dismissal of cases based on foreign counterpart actions 
that would occur under other standards through no fault of U.S. authorities.181 
An odd consequence of this proposal is that the privilege against 
self-incrimination would no longer be an absolute protection against the use 
of irreparably tainted testimony at trial. Instead, while the privilege would be 
acknowledged to apply to foreign government–compelled testimony, some 
otherwise inadmissible testimony would be allowed to enter trials simply 
because it was collected by foreign agents and then leaked to U.S. prosecutors 
or witnesses despite American best efforts to avoid leakage. 
Importantly, defining “taint” is a fundamentally different exercise than 
judging an allowable degree of taint. Under strict taint wall standards as seen 
in the North case,182 the question becomes whether or not taint occurred. 
 
179 See United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 129 (2d Cir. 2003) (applying a good-faith efforts 
standard to a failed U.S. prosecutorial attempt to obtain all relevant materials from foreign law 
enforcement); see also United States v. Paternina-Vergara, 749 F.2d 993, 998 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding 
that prosecutors are at most required to use good-faith efforts to procure foreign law enforcement 
materials and finding U.S. officials met that burden). 
180 See United States v. Reyeros, 537 F.3d 270, 285 n.20 (3d Cir. 2008) (declining to extend the 
Paternina-Vergara ruling); United States v. Friedman, 593 F.2d 109, 119-20 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding 
that the U.S. government was not required under the Jencks Act to produce information seized by 
the Chilean government but not addressing any sort of “best efforts” standard); cf. United States v. 
Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1225 (9th Cir. 1988), rev’d, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (distinguishing 
U.S. law enforcement obligations from those articulated in Paternina-Vergara on the grounds that 
the U.S. government was engaged in a “joint venture” with foreign law enforcement officials). 
181 Cf. supra note 91 (noting from practitioners that the Second Circuit’s Allen decision will increase 
the prosecutorial burden to a degree that in some cases prosecutions will be abandoned). The Balsys Court 
was particularly concerned with this issue in its holding on the converse of the Allen situation. See United 
States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 698 (1998) (“We therefore must suppose that on Balsys’s view some 
evidence will in fact be lost to the domestic courts, and we are accordingly unable to dismiss the position 
of the United States in this case, that domestic law enforcement would suffer serious consequences if fear 
of foreign prosecution were recognized as sufficient to invoke the privilege.”). 
182 United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 872-73 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (judging the taint wall 
insufficient against a much higher Kastigar standard that required proof “that the witness was never 
exposed to North’s immunized testimony, or that the allegedly tainted testimony contain[ed] no 
evidence not ‘canned’ by the prosecution before such exposure occurred”). 
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Under this proposal, irreparable taint stipulated to have occurred under any 
standard could be admissible at trial. This result would be a novel legal 
development and a step backward for strong constitutional protections. The 
relatively low bar set by a reasonable best efforts standard for prosecutors that 
allows for admittedly unconstitutional testimony to enter U.S. trials violates 
our values and creates some potential for prosecutorial manipulation. Overall, 
a standalone “reasonable best efforts” test would create significant 
vulnerabilities in constitutional protections. 
D. Setting a Clear Line for Cooperative Internationalism 
Another option is to set a clear line based on the Balsys concept of 
cooperative internationalism.183 Such a test would question U.S. law 
enforcement control over testimony and create more generally an on–off 
standard of applicability. From the current precedent, there would seem to be 
a sliding scale for cooperative internationalism: at one extreme is Balsys, 
finding no Fifth Amendment protections because the foreign authorities act 
entirely separately from U.S. authorities,184 and at the other extreme is In re 
Terrorist Bombings, where Fifth Amendment protections are implicated when 
foreign governments allow U.S. officials to enter their territory and conduct 
interrogations of suspects themselves.185 Somewhere between these two 
extremes is the threshold for what could constitute cooperative 
internationalism, which the Balsys Court only briefly addresses.186 As 
discussed in Section II.B., current practices could, on a case-by-case basis, be 
found to constitute cooperative internationalism. The Balsys Court seems to 
identify a few factors: (1) substantially similar criminal codes aimed at 
prosecuting offenses of an international character,187 (2) evidence that 
prosecutors were intentionally granting immunity with the intention of 
providing that evidence for prosecutions in the partner country, and (3) so 
 
183 See supra Section II.B. 
184 Balsys, 524 U.S. at 692. 
185 See In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in East Africa v. Odeh, 552 F.3d 177, 181 (2d 
Cir. 2008); cf. United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 82-83 (2d Cir. 2003). 
186 See Balsys, 524 U.S. at 696 (stating that a cost–benefit analysis would be necessary to 
determine whether cooperative internationalism should be found). 
187 Note that efforts to standardize criminal codes were underway well before Balsys was 
decided, as Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties and Extradition Treaties have long relied on the 
concept of dual criminality—that something must be a crime in both countries—in order to offer 
international evidence gathering or extradition assistance. For a general discussion of Mutual Legal 
Assistance Treaties and international law enforcement cooperation channels, including a discussion 
of dual criminality, see Thomas G. Snow, The Investigation and Prosecution of White Collar Crime: 
International Challenges and the Legal Tools Available to Address Them, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
209 (2002) and specifically page 214 n.15 for a citation to the U.S. extradition treaty with Egypt 
dating back to 1874. 
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little differentiation between the two enforcement authorities that prosecution 
could not be “fairly characterized as distinctly ‘foreign.’”188 These stringent 
factors can be interpreted to implicate a quasi-agency doctrine, requiring that 
the foreign government have acted as an agent of the U.S. government. 
The problem with the Balsys test alone, as argued by some, is that it allows 
for significant manipulation by prosecutors and removes any Fifth 
Amendment burdens from them so long as foreign counterparts are kept 
somewhat at arm’s length.189 Furthermore, this approach would raise many 
technicalities: What if prosecutors are only acting under cooperative 
internationalism on certain aspects of a case? What if prosecutors cooperate 
in bad faith with foreign counterparts knowing the results will be useful to 
circumvent the Fifth Amendment even if they are not working particularly 
closely together? What if other governmental officials, like the State 
Department or members of Congress, intervene to ensure the “right 
questions” from an American perspective are asked by foreign authorities to 
avoid U.S. prosecutorial involvement?190 By defining the applicability of the 
Fifth Amendment in terms of this single dimension, the standard would leave 
much room for abuse of discretion by prosecutors to chip away at the 
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. 
E. Recommending a Hybrid 
Ultimately, I suggest that courts adopt a middle ground, combining the Balsys 
test, which measures the extent of international cooperation,191 with a requirement 
of good faith that is presumed where prosecutors make reasonable best efforts to 
prevent taint. First, courts would analyze the closeness of coordination between 
U.S. and foreign law enforcement under the cooperative internationalism 
standard, likely approximating the joint venture standard outlined in the 
 
188 Balsys, 524 U.S. at 698 (“If it could be said that the United States and its allies had enacted 
substantially similar criminal codes aimed at prosecuting offenses of international character, and if it 
could be shown that the United States was granting immunity from domestic prosecution for the purpose 
of obtaining evidence to be delivered to other nations as prosecutors of a crime common to both 
countries, then an argument could be made that the Fifth Amendment should apply based on fear of 
foreign prosecution simply because that prosecution was not fairly characterized as distinctly ‘foreign.’”). 
189 See James C. Moon, Fifth Amendment Apogee: How the Supreme Court’s Ruling in United 
States v. Balsys Checked American Ideas of Personal Liberty at Our Borders, 32 CONN. L. REV. 351, 
377-79 (1999) (arguing that the Balsys decision was an invitation to government overreach and too 
quickly relieves prosecutors of the Fifth Amendment burden). 
190 This concern would likely not be as significant because Fifth Amendment privileges against 
self-incrimination apply to other U.S. governmental bodies like executive branch employers and 
Congress, as discussed in Section III.C, so it does not seem a stretch to assume that those entities 
could also trigger charges of “cooperative internationalism.” 
191 Balsys, 524 U.S. at 698 (postulating that the threshold for cooperative internationalism is 
based on the relative level of coordination in which two governments engage). 
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voluntariness analysis of subsection III.B.1. In circumstances where cooperative 
internationalism is found, there would be a black-and-white application of the 
privilege against self-incrimination. Foreign government–compelled testimony 
would not be admissible in U.S. courts. For situations judged to demonstrate less 
than cooperative internationalism, foreign government–compelled testimony 
would be admissible in U.S. courts unless bad faith efforts by prosecutors called 
into question the true nature of international cooperation in that case. 
Accordingly, U.S. prosecutors would be expected to take reasonable efforts in 
good faith to prevent taint of their witnesses, evidence, and other aspects related 
to trial. As in the FCPA context,192 respecting the laws of countries where a 
slightly different right to self-incrimination exists could be considered good 
faith efforts on the part of a prosecutor. 
Although unorthodox, this solution best recognizes the unique, third 
party nature of foreign governments. It has the benefit of establishing some 
Fifth Amendment protections while minimizing the number of cases lost due 
to taint leakage. Such a policy would leave prosecutors wide discretion in 
their dealings with foreign governments and would allow them to put faith in 
their best judgments. It would also remedy the intellectual consistency issue 
of a reasonable best efforts standard, focusing the analysis on the overall 
foreignness of the testimony rather than the actions of U.S. prosecutors 
related to tainted testimony. More practically, because of the increasing 
globalization of economies and crime,193 prosecutors need to have clear 
guidelines, which this would provide, and flexibility when dealing with an 
issue that, in some cases, will simply be out of the control of U.S. law 
enforcement. A standard like this proposed hybrid would accommodate the 
nuances of cases likely to arise in this constitutional grey area and would 
effectively balance constitutional protections and the rule of law. 
F. Requiring Full Fifth Amendment Protections 
A sixth path is to follow the Second Circuit and require that all Justice 
Department investigations go beyond even the measures the Department 
took in Allen. Although this would be resource intensive, it would also provide 
the most effective safeguard of a defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights by 
eliminating the possibility of even an accidental leakage between a foreign 
and domestic prosecution. However, given the spike since 2008 in 
 
192 See supra Section IV.B. 
193 See UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, THE GLOBALIZATION OF 
CRIME: A TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME THREAT ASSESSMENT ii (2010), 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/TOCTA_Report_2010_low_res.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W8UQ-SMLM] (discussing the unprecedented pace of economic globalization and 
new transnational criminal developments it has spurred). 
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international white collar crime investigations, and with international law 
enforcement cooperation accompanying that spike, this path may be 
unsustainable in the long run, or may significantly damage the rule of law 
with regards to international crimes.194 Inevitably, errors by foreign 
counterparts or unintentional mistakes by U.S. authorities will lead to case 
dismissals where prosecutors could otherwise secure convictions. In addition, 
this policy would be susceptible to manipulation by foreign powers, who 
could sabotage U.S. trials by intentionally publicizing tainted information. 
Though the Second Circuit dismissed such a concern in its ruling as no longer 
truly “involuntary” testimony,195 one can easily think of situations where a 
corrupt regime could obscure how voluntary testimony truly was, and a U.S. 
court would not be well-equipped to draw the line between corrupt voluntary 
testimony and legitimately compelled testimony. Also, it seems odd that the 
U.S. government would only accept corruptly compelled testimony and 
would reject as unconstitutional testimony collected legitimately under the 
rule of law in another country. If anything, this outcome contravenes the 
reliability justification for a voluntariness standard discussed in subsection 
III.B.1, because testimony contrived by a foreign government for the purpose 
of stymieing a U.S. investigation is not likely to be reliable. More 
fundamentally, defendants in international crimes would functionally receive 
stronger protections than defendants in purely domestic crimes, as 
prosecutors face complex international evidentiary burdens that prevent 
them from pursuing cases they would have no trouble prosecuting 
domestically.196 Given that international crimes implicating U.S. jurisdiction 
in this context are far more likely to be perpetrated by those with the 
resources to travel and communicate internationally, this discrepancy 
privileges rich defendants over poor defendants.197 When dealing with an 
 
194 See generally Lara Kroop Delamarre, Preparing for DOJ’s International Investigations, LAW360 
(Feb. 15, 2017, 11:46 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/891511/preparing-for-doj-s-international-
investigations [https://perma.cc/4LCK-KDLG] (highlighting the DOJ’s increased focus on pursuing 
international white collar crime); The Fraud Section’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Plan and Guidance, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CRIMINAL DIV. (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-
fraud/file/838416/download [https://perma.cc/FVX5-FFVS] (demonstrating the DOJ’s commitment 
of resources to FCPA cases, which often involve cooperative prosecutions with foreign governments). 
195 United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63, 88 (2d Cir. 2017) (“[S]hould the circumstances in a particular 
case indicate that a foreign defendant had faced no real threat of sanctions by his foreign government for 
not testifying, then that defendant’s testimony might well not be considered involuntary.”). 
196 See supra note 91. 
197 At the same time, note that the full scope of transnational crime is hard to quantify or define, though 
it includes many crimes traditionally committed by those with resources. Cf. COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
RELATIONS, THE GLOBAL REGIME FOR TRANSNATIONAL CRIME (2013) https://www.cfr.org/report/
global-regime-transnational-crime [https://perma.cc/FP8M-ZAEH] (discussing current trends in types and 
scope of transnational crime, including increased trafficking of drugs and counterfeit medicines, 
environmental crimes like illegal logging, and arms smuggling). However, this argument is predicated 
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issue as complex as foreign government–compelled testimony, it is hard to 
establish a straightforward answer. 
CONCLUSION 
As highlighted in the post-trial Kastigar hearing from United States v. 
Allen198 (though seemingly denied in the Second Circuit opinion199), there is 
no national consensus in current jurisprudence on whether compelled 
testimony elicited by a foreign government violates the Fifth Amendment. Yet 
there will come a time when other circuits facing cases like Allen will need to 
address the admissibility of foreign government–compelled testimony. While 
analogous Supreme Court precedent in Balsys seems to speak to the issue 
through its reasoning and provides a model for determining admissibility 
through its warnings on cooperative internationalism, the practical application 
of any doctrine will be fact-specific until a sufficient number of these cases 
reach the courts. Courts considering similar cases in the future can find 
ammunition for applicability in the silent assumptions of Bram, where the 
historical practice of applying the Self-Incrimination Clause in international 
cases dates back to 1897. They might also adopt principles, particularly on 
voluntariness and due process, from the Miranda warnings case law. Other 
similarly-situated entities as compared to U.S. law enforcement, like 
Congress, can also provide insight into how a non-U.S. law enforcement entity 
should be treated with regards to U.S. constitutional obligations. 
Pulling from this amalgamation of U.S. policies and traditions, 
possibilities for how courts will rule under the current case law are numerous. 
Among six different points along the potential spectrum of protections, this 
Comment recommends a hybrid policy balancing constitutional protections 
and reasonable efforts by prosecutors by emphasizing the closeness of 
coordination between U.S. law enforcement and their foreign counterparts, as 
well as efforts by prosecutors, where cooperation is not exceptionally close, to 
prevent taint. Different courts may choose different approaches to enforcing 
Fifth Amendment protections on foreign government–compelled testimony, 
but it is important that the jurisprudence on this question evolve quickly and 
clearly so as not to waste excessive government resources on unprosecutable 
or unwinnable cases. International law enforcement cooperation is 
skyrocketing, and with it will come new challenges for our government. 
Although this may require courts to take a more active role in foreign affairs, 
it reflects the new realities of globalization: justice is no longer a local concern. 
 
on the assumption that law enforcement authorities will pursue predominantly the leaders of 
international criminal organizations, rather than the lowest-level members who may lack means. 
198 United States v. Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d 684, 690 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
199 Supra note 6. 
